Already Focused on Iran, Congress Looks at a New Phase in US-Iran Relations

Lawmakers returned to Washington after a short break away from the Capitol. Their two-week recess coincided with major developments in the Middle East. The United States and Iran have held three rounds of direct talks over the latter’s nuclear program, but the situation remains delicate as a tentative fourth round of talks was recently postponed. While direct diplomacy over the last month is a significant development, President Donald Trump’s volatile approach to foreign policy has clouded any ability to predict what will come of the moment.

Since January, Democratic and Republican lawmakers have busily worked to codify into law elements of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran. The Trump administration outlined the policy in a February 3 National Security Memorandum, NSPM-2, which established as US policy several objectives relating to Iran, broadly focusing on nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, its influence throughout the region, and its access to global financial markets. Sanctions have been a cornerstone of this approach. Since January, the Trump administration has announced 16 new sets of sanctions on individuals and entities because of their relationship with the Iranian government. This trend is showing no signs of slowing down. On May 1, the same day that a fourth round of US-Iran talks was postponed, Trump took to Truth Social to write that “All purchases of Iranian Oil, or Petrochemical products, must stop, NOW! Any Country or person who buys ANY AMOUNT of OIL or PETROCHEMICALS from Iran will be subject to, immediately, Secondary Sanctions.”

Pressure on Iran has come in more expressly violent rhetoric as well. While threatening to hold Iran directly accountable for continued Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, Trump declared on March 29 that “If they [Iranians] don’t make a deal, there will be bombing…it will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” Just a few days later, with tensions rising, the administration directed the military to bolster US force posture in the region, adding a carrier strike group to the CENTCOM area of responsibility and deploying additional squadrons and air assets. Trump has continued to employ escalatory rhetoric since then, though he has also publicly stated his preference for a diplomatic resolution.

Legislative Activity on Iran

In this context, Iran has featured prominently on the legislative agenda of the 119th Congress. But despite widespread interest in Iran throughout Congress, lawmakers have been reluctant to share the Trump administration’s hawkishness. Notably, legislation introduced in February 2025 by Representative Jared Moskowitz (D-FL) (H.Res.105) affirming the opinion that “all options” must be considered to counter Iranian threats to the United States, Israel, and allies has failed to gain much traction, only seeing two cosponsors in the months since its introduction. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has led the hawkish contingency in the Senate, but there too meaningful support for any direct military strike on Iran has been limited. Graham-led legislation, S.Res.43 and S.Res.101, both of which proffer potential support for direct strikes on Iran, also only have two cosponsors since their introduction last January and February, respectively.

Instead, lawmakers have explored other means of applying pressure on Iran. An April 1 hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, entitled “A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian Regime’s Malign Activities,” aptly set the tone for this agenda. In turn, lawmakers have looked into targeting Iran’s finances, with most of their efforts aimed at expanding sanctions. From February 12 to April 1, Congress saw the introduction of at least eleven new pieces of legislation that either seek to expand sanctions on Iran or that otherwise target its access to financial capital.

Codifying Sanctions on Iran
Bill Date Purpose
S.556 2/12/25 To expand sanctions enforcement
S.Res.81 2/13/25 To initiate snapback of sanctions under UNSCR 2231
H.Res.139 2/13/25 To initiate snapback of sanctions under UNSCR 2231
H.R.1422 2/18/25 To sanction on petrochemical trade
H.R.1800 3/3/25 To repeal sunset provision on previous sanctions
H.R.2012 3/10/25 To provide for Congressional review of sanctions
S.1153 3/26/25 To prevent funding via special drawing rights at the IMF
H.R.2468 3/27/25 To prohibit the issuance of licenses or other sanctions waivers
H.R.2570 4/1/25 To impose additional sanctions
H.R.2574 4/1/25 To sanction exports of Iranian natural gas to Iraq
H.R.2575 4/1/25 To freeze sanctioned assets and prohibit lifting of sanctions

 

Additionally, Congress has homed in on regional threats posed by Iran. Lawmakers have broadly expressed concerns for Iran’s support of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and presence in Syria and Iraq. Iran’s network of regional influence was the subject of significant discussion during a March 25 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on worldwide threats, and Iran is a common theme in this year’s annual threat assessment from the US intelligence community.

 Targeting Regional Influence
Bill Date Purpose
S.Res.72 2/12/25 To halt Iran’s funding for Hamas
H.Res.166 2/26/25 To condemn Iran for regional instability
H.R.2505 3/31/25 To target unmanned aerial vehicle export network
H.R.2581 4/1/25 To designate 29 groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
H.R.2658 4/3/25 To limit Iran’s influence in Iraq

 

Members of Congress have also voiced concern over Iran’s ability to exert influence in the United States. For example, a significant portion of Congress’ hysteria around pro-Palestine protests at higher education institutions has relied on claims that student protesters are foreign agents of, or are at least supported by, Iran and other malign foreign actors. These claims are levied both to delegitimize the protests and to manufacture panic around Iran’s ability to threaten US national security from within. Aside from higher education, additional concerns include efforts to step up criminal penalties for offenses committed by individuals with suspected ties to the Iranian government and to prevent any land holdings of individuals connected to the Iranian government.

Other
Bill Date Purpose
S.197 1/22/25 To review real estate purchases connected to Iranian government
H.R.1220 2/11/25 To increase fees on immigrants from Iran
S.1136 3/26/25 To enhance criminal sentences for offenses directed by Iranian government
H.R.2394 3/26/25 To enhance criminal sentences for offenses directed by Iranian government
S.Res.145 3/27/25 To protect Iranian political refugees in Ashraf-3 in Albania
H.R.1048 2/6/25 To require additional disclosures by US colleges and universities of foreign funding relationships, namely Iran
H.R.2614 4/2/25 To establish strategy to support internet freedom in Iran
S.1296 4/3/25 To require additional disclosures by US colleges and universities of foreign funding relationships, namely Iran.
H.R.2778 4/7/25 To require US universities to disclose gifts they receive from Iran
S.1317 4/7/25 To require US universities to disclose gifts they receive from Iran
H.R.2754 4/9/25 To require review of real estate purchases connected to Iranian government
H.R.2917 4/14/25 To require disclosure of government awards going to an entity located in Iran
Unnumbered 4/16/25 To strengthen criminal penalties for individuals who commit crimes in the United States on behalf of Iran

Takeaways

Short of formally consenting to direct strikes on Iran, lawmakers have demonstrated an eagerness to advance Trump’s “maximum pressure” agenda. Legislative items to provide for new sanctions and pressure on the Iranian government have been among the most proposed in the short time that the 119th Congress has been in session. Several of these bills have already passed out of their respective committees, setting the stage for chamber-wide votes in the near future. To be sure, Iran has proven to be an area of relatively easy bipartisanship. Almost all lawmakers agree that Iran should not be left to develop a nuclear weapon and that its access to global financial markets should be limited as long as it continues to support a network of proxies that purportedly threaten the United States’s regional interests.

Consequently, more of the same can likely be expected from Congress as policymakers look to mirror Trump’s Iran agenda over the coming months; unless new developments suddenly emerge and alter the current situation. Additionally, any nuclear deal between the United States and Iran is a long way off, and the recent postponement of a next round of talks will only extend that timeline further. Still, Congress’ close attention to Iran is not going anywhere anytime soon.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors. 

Featured image credit: US House of Representatives