The election on January 9, 2025, of the Lebanese Army Commander Joseph Aoun as the fourteenth president of Lebanon can very well be the inauguration of the Lebanese Third Republic, a development that could usher in a new politics for the country. The First Republic came into being after a quick revolt by a group of sectarian elites against French mandatory rule in 1943 inaugurated independent Lebanon while the Second came with the end of the 1975-1990 civil war and the signing of the Taif Accords in Saudi Arabia in 1989. This third one, however, promises new hope for the country if domestic actors know how to exploit advantageous regional and international conditions and avoid the pitfalls of competition between political factions that led to the country’s extant political and economic troubles.
Aoun had been considered the natural candidate for the highest office in the land because of his position as commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, arguably the most cohesive and popular state institution in the country. He is the fifth army commander to be elected president since 1958 in a multi-sectarian, parliamentary, constitutional, democratic republic. Considering the challenges facing him and the country, his six-year tenure will test his mettle as leader and arbiter between myriad contentious political factions and agendas. His success in addressing Lebanon’s complications and in corralling competing interests will indeed reflect whether this Third Republic will survive and with it the country as an independent nation-state.
Perhaps what sends an initial signal of optimism in Aoun’s ability to successfully launch the Third Republic is the selection of Nawaf Salam as prime minister-designate by a majority of parliamentarians in constitutionally required consultations. Salam is an internationally recognized jurist and currently serves as the President of the International Court of Justice. He formerly represented Lebanon at the United Nations from 2007 to 2017. He received 84 votes to 9 for his rival, current caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, while 34 members of parliament—including those belonging to Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement—decided not to endorse a candidate. Their refraining to name him—they preferred friendly Mikati—deprives Salam of the direct support of the main parties that represent the Shia community in the country, a potential stumbling block to the smooth functioning of his incoming cabinet.
But this possibility may not materialize, considering both the high degree of support that Aoun and Salam received in parliament (99 and 84 votes out of 128, respectively) and the reality that Hezbollah—long considered final decisionmaker in government and state policies—has been weakened vis-à-vis other political factions. Indeed, while it is still very hard to claim that Hezbollah has been decisively defeated by Israel in over 14 months of conflict, the party has been severely bruised and has lost much of its invincibility because of the circumstances surrounding its confrontation with the Zionist state. First, its popular areas of support in the south, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the northeast of the country have sustained incalculable economic losses and physical destruction, raising doubts about its ability to protect its constituencies.
Second, by acceding to a ceasefire with Israel, Hezbollah has also been forced to abandon its areas of military operations south of the Litani River, and thus involuntarily cede its claim to be the defender of the country against Israeli attacks. Third, with the Lebanese Armed Forces gradually deploying alongside United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon along the border with Israel and agreeing to implement the stipulations of the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006, Hezbollah will be hard pressed to constitute a fighting force in the near future. These considerations and the concomitant inability by Iran to resupply the party with weapons through Syria that strengthen it in Lebanon’s domestic politics has for all intents and purposes finally made Hezbollah less influential in the political process and more open to compromise.
One direct result of these Hezbollah tribulations is the distinct possibility that the party may have lost the ability to force the expected cabinet of Nawaf Salam to accept the principle of “army, people, resistance” in its putative government program. It may also have lost its ability to force said cabinet to give the opposition—which Hezbollah could very well lead from now on—one-third of the cabinet’s posts so that it can opt constitutionally to collapse the government by ordering its ministers to resign, as it and its allies did in 2011 against former Prime Minister Saad Hariri. These two principles—the trifecta of army, people, resistance and the one-third contingency—have been “swords of Damocles” above the heads of successive prime ministers, allowing Hezbollah to dictate government policies and decisions to the detriment of effective governance. With its strong ties to Iran, Hezbollah also allowed Tehran to have inordinate influence in Beirut to the detriment of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence.
On the other hand, the election of Aoun and the selection of Salam have found regional and international good tidings and support. Perhaps the most advantageous development for the launching of a promising Third Republic in Lebanon was the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the emergence of what seems so far to be a moderate version of an Islamist political setup that is focused on restructuring Syria’s political order and reviving its economy. During a recent visit by PM Mikati to Damascus, Syria’s new ruler Ahmad al-Sharaa pledged to stay neutral in dealing with Lebanon’s domestic issues, a far cry from Assad’s Syria’s preferential treatment of Hezbollah and its allies for decades prior to his overthrow. Hezbollah was instrumental in preventing the Syrian regime from collapsing during Syria’s Revolution when it sent thousands of its fighters to fight the opposition to Assad. As a result, Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanese politics prior to Assad’s fall aligned Lebanon squarely with the Syria-Iran camp despite widespread political and popular opposition to linking the country to the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.”
Another circle of support for Lebanon’s new order came from the Arab world and international powers; importantly the Gulf states, the United States, and France. Good relations with the Gulf countries will not only augur well for renewed ties to the wider Arab world but will also secure needed funding for economic recovery and reconstruction following a long war between Hezbollah and Israel. Lebanon today needs to put its economic house back in order following a precipitous financial collapse and severe devaluation of its national currency. According to the World Bank, Lebanon sustained $8.5 billion in “physical damages and economic losses” as the cost of Hezbollah’s war with Israel. It was reported that Saudi Arabia was fully invested in providing reconstruction assistance to Lebanon were Aoun to be elected to the presidency, a wish duly realized on January 9. Other Gulf Cooperation Countries are also committed to helping the new Lebanese government once it is formed.
Conditions today following the election of Aoun and the selection of Salam are indeed conducive to the launching of Lebanon’s Third Republic. For it to succeed, three important requirements are necessary. First, the republic must receive the full support and cooperation of the Lebanese people in order for the Lebanese state to reestablish its sovereign institutions and respect for the rule of law. Second, President Aoun and Prime Minister-designate Salam must be adept at using diplomatic skills effectively domestically, regionally, and internationally. Third, considering fluid conditions in the eastern Mediterranean, the international community must exert its efforts to help the country’s new leadership surmount the many difficult obstacles they will face. Chiefly, it is important for major influential powers to unite in curbing neighboring Israel’s aggressive designs in southern Lebanon and against the entire country.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Facebook/Lebanese Presidency
