Lebanon’s Presidential Crisis: Causes and Likely Outcomes

Riad Salameh, who has been Governor of Lebanon’s central bank, Banque du Liban, for thirty years, now faces major corruption charges, with his mandate set to end on 31 July, but while Najib Mikati’s temporary government is running the country, the necessary reforms to address the financial crisis cannot yet be approved. The reforms require the formation of a government with full powers – impossible without electing a new President. Various parties are trying to persuade Hezbollah to abandon its support for the candidacy of former minister Suleiman Frangieh, opposed by the majority, and to find an alternative who is accepted by local, regional and international actors. However, most political parties in Lebanon prefer the continued presidential vacuum to Hezbollah imposing its own nominee by vetoing any other candidates.

Prominent Candidates

The Political Parties

Hezbollah selected a Maronite candidate in Suleiman Franjieh without the approval of its Maronite ally, Gebran Bassil, causing a rift with Bassil’s Free Patriotic Movement, with which had it been allied since the so-called “Mar Mikhael Agreement” in February 2006. The agreement had led to Hezbollah supporting Michel Aoun’s presidency in 2016, in return for the Free Patriotic Movement providing political cover for Hezbollah’s weapons, and preventing it from being isolated in Lebanon. Bassil's position has undermined Franjieh's chances of becoming president. Hezbollah insists on supporting Franjieh's candidacy because they believe him to be trustworthy and because they supported Michel Aoun in previous elections at the expense of old ally Franjieh. Therefore, this time Hezbollah wants to restore balance to their relationship with the latter, empowered by the Syrian regime’s political rehabilitation and the weakness of Sunni representation in Parliament, the decline of Saudi interest in Lebanon, and France’s acceptance of this nomination. So far, Hezbollah has not been able to bridge the views between Bassil and Franjieh, despite successfully shutting down any media battles between them.

It is clear that the Movement’s main goal in supporting Azour’s nomination is preventing Franjieh reaching the presidency, or at the very least, to convince Hezbollah of an alternative. Hezbollah has not yet shown any willingness to abandon Franjieh's candidacy or accept a compromise. They have not proposed an alternative candidate that would be accepted by other parties, especially since Bassil opposes the candidacy of General Joseph Aoun, whose military position does not allow him to speak publicly about politics. While Hezbollah has had a positive relationship with the army commander over the past six years, it does not want to repeat the experience of former army commander Michel Suleiman, who abandoned the neutrality in foreign policy stipulated by the Doha agreement that brought him to power as soon as he was inaugurated.

International Responses to the Crisis

Likely Scenarios

In the event the opposition continues to put its weight behind Azour and a second session was held to elect a president, he would need an additional 6 votes to secure his victory. The parliamentary bloc that could secure his win is the “Independent Parliamentary Meeting”, which is affiliated with Saad Hariri. This bloc did not vote for Azour in the first round, but the pressure is increasing on it to make up its mind to vote when the next electoral session is held. Hence, Azour's victory is mathematically possible, but the nature of sectarian balances in the Lebanese system will put the odds against him, especially since all the Shi’i seats in Parliament are distributed between Hezbollah and Amal. For his part, Franjieh needs the support of the Free Patriotic Movement or the Lebanese Forces as a major Christian parliamentary bloc behind him. Thus, no significant electoral shifts are expected in the near future without a significant change in loyalties.

Ziad Baroud and Joseph Aoun have not yet established an electoral support base, so their chances rely on consensus. In the case of Aoun, he must gain two-thirds of the votes in the House of Representatives to amend the third paragraph of Article 49 of the constitution, which prohibits the election of judges and grade one civil servants to the presidency of the republic if they are still in employment. Despite the existence of two precedents in which this article was amended after the Taif Agreement – the first when the army commander, General Émile Lahoud, was elected president in 1998 and the second when Michel Suleiman was elected in 2008 – the amendment requires the addition of a paragraph that allows for the exceptional election of judges or grade one civil servants as president.

Accordingly, until a regional and international agreement is reached, Lebanese political parties remain in a continuous effort to improve their conditions and build their alliances. Meanwhile France seeks to convene negotiations that are accompanied by regional and international consultations, hoping also to benefit from the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, which has not yet been reflected in Lebanon. Although the Lebanese party calculations are traditionally linked to international and regional equations and the development of relations between external powers and their interests, the Lebanese crisis is in its essence domestic, at its heart the sectarian quota system that is somewhat responsible for all of Lebanon's political, economic and security problems.