It wasn’t that long ago that Russia and China seemed to dominate the Middle East, and the United States was on the brink of relegation to the sidelines.
Russia has parlayed its alliance with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah into a victory, of sorts, in the Syrian civil war, and used that victory as an advertisement to juice Russian arms sales and as a platform to expand its power in the eastern Mediterranean. Weapons sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia have followed. Russia expanded its influence in Libya, worked closely with Riyadh to dominate OPEC+, and even deepened ties with Israel, whose leader, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has extolled his relations with President Vladimir Putin.
Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) helped transform Beijing into the largest foreign investor in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and its impact goes beyond economics. To hear China tell it, BRI has proved an appealing model for the region in the political realm too, with governments admiring China’s economic rise “while maintaining political stability.” In other words, revving the economy and making money for elites while maintaining an iron grip on domestic politics. What’s not to like? China’s brokerage of a diplomatic reconciliation deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran last March positioned Beijing as a new political arbiter that could go places and do things Washington couldn’t. The deal didn’t change much in the way of basic political realities in the Gulf, but rang some alarm bells in Washington.
US hegemony, it appeared, was waning, and a new era had dawned. It was only a matter of time before multipolarity edged out the United States in the Middle East and brought about a new order, with Russia and China competing on equal terms for power and prestige in the Gulf and elsewhere. To he United States was, at best, becoming one side of an equilateral triangle formed by three equally influential world powers.
Suddenly, Russia and China appear to be mostly on the sidelines of a major regional conflict, wondering how to make their voices and views count on the diplomatic stage.
That may still prove true, but the war in Gaza has changed things. Suddenly, Russia and China appear to be mostly on the sidelines of a major regional conflict, wondering how to make their voices and views count on the diplomatic stage. The United States, by contrast, is more relevant than ever, and seems to hold the key to regional peace, if it chooses to turn it.
How did we get to this point?
Russia: Seeking Advantage, Distracting from Ukraine
Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel on October 7 seemed to catch Russia by surprise. But it rapidly regained its sangfroid as it perceived an opportunity to leverage the war in Gaza to its own advantage. Moscow’s strategy in Ukraine, which deliberately targets civilians and civilian infrastructure, proved no moral impediment to launching a salvo of criticism aimed at Israel’s offensive in Gaza. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov opined that the Israeli bombing campaign contravened international law. President Putin said that Israel’s siege of Gaza resembled Nazi Germany’s siege of Leningrad. A host of other politicians and Kremlin hangers-on chimed in with their own takes, none favorable to Israel. No one offered condemnation of the Hamas attack.
But nothing compared (in shock value, at least) to Moscow’s decision to host a delegation led by a senior Hamas leader, Moussa Abu Marzook, on October 26, three weeks after its assault in southern Israel. Russia had hosted delegations from Hamas twice earlier in 2023, but the timing and implicit message of this one were alarming. In response to criticism in the West, Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov proffered the excuse that it is “necessary to continue our contacts with all parties.”
The delegation met with Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and focused mainly on the release of hostages, primarily the six or so holding Russian citizenship, according to Moscow. But the very fact of the meeting also helped to highlight Moscow’s unrelenting criticism of Israel and its main supporter, the United States. Hamas was certainly grateful; Abu Marzook characterized Moscow as “our closest friend.” Three Russian hostages were subsequently released.
The dual focuses of trade and oil conspicuously pointed out the omnipresence of Russia in the politics of the Arab region, reinforcing the Kremlin’s message of its centrality and relevance despite its war against Ukraine.
Putin himself was also active on the diplomatic front. He made his own whirlwind tour of the Gulf in early December, stopping in both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, to the effusive praise of his hosts. Putin mainly appeared to have the war in Ukraine on his mind, touting the growing trade relations between Russia and his hosts to demonstrate that his country is not entirely isolated even among some of Washington’s closest allies. Behind closed doors he likely expressed appreciation for their neutral stance on Russia’s aggression, which appeared to be an important goal of the trip. In Riyadh Putin also highlighted Russian-Saudi cooperation on fixing global oil prices within OPEC+. The dual focuses of trade and oil conspicuously pointed out the omnipresence of Russia in the politics of the Arab region, reinforcing the Kremlin’s message of its centrality and relevance despite its war against Ukraine.
Gaza was not at the top of Putin’s agenda, but it didn’t have to be. Russia’s stance on Gaza had already laid the groundwork for Putin’s warm reception, enabling him to emphasize his role as statesman at a time when the United States finds itself in a difficult position. Putin picked up the Gaza theme the day after his return from the Gulf, hosting President Ibrahim Raisi of Iran for talks that prominently featured the war in Gaza, and (out of public view) the deepening political-military cooperation between the two countries on Ukraine.
China: Appearing Responsible, But Playing the Same Game
China has taken more of a traditional diplomatic approach to the Gaza crisis (i.e., no invitations to Hamas and Iran) and has stuck publicly to safe, standard language, calling for a “just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement” of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Beijing sent an envoy to the region in October for discussions on the situation, during which he stressed the importance of an immediate ceasefire. In November, Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted a visiting delegation of Arab and Islamic foreign ministers during their tour of the five UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent member capitals. Wang took the opportunity to stress that China remains a “good friend and brother of Arab and Muslim countries” that has “always firmly supported the just cause of the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights and interests.”
China has taken more of a traditional diplomatic approach to the Gaza crisis (i.e., no invitations to Hamas and Iran) and has stuck publicly to safe, standard language, calling for a “just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement” of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The foreign minister chaired a UNSC meeting on Gaza on November 29 during its council presidency that month, and emphasized that Beijing strongly favors a ceasefire and movement toward a two-state solution. To back up his message, Wang introduced a five point Chinese peace plan that places heavy emphasis on the United Nations, calling for implementation of all relevant UN resolutions on the conflict and an international conference organized by the world body that leads to a two-state solution, all overseen by the Security Council.
The plan was widely considered too lacking in specifics to be actionable, but it helped make China’s implied point that it was ready to step up in the role of global superpower on the side of the Palestinian cause, in contrast to “the repeated and persistent obstruction of a permanent member of the Council,” as Wang told the visiting Arab and Islamic ministers. That “permanent member,” the United States, has for its part urged Beijing to use its influence with Iran to prevent a wider regional escalation of the conflict, a tacit acknowledgment of the country’s influence. Whether that will occur, let alone have results, remains to be seen.
Moscow and Beijing Lack Influence Where It Counts
Still, aside from their highly publicized efforts to appeal to Arab governments and public opinion, and to aggrandize their international images to the disadvantage of Washington, neither Moscow nor Beijing has proven capable of playing the type of diplomatic role that might help bring the current violence to an end or set the stage for a political horizon that could lead to a final settlement of the Palestine-Israel conflict. It is President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken who have been most intensively engaged with regional governments, not Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or their foreign ministers. It is Washington, not Moscow or Beijing, that was able to work closely with Doha and Tel Aviv to engineer a series of humanitarian pauses in the fighting and bring about the release of hostages held by Hamas. And it is only Washington that is still seen by regional parties, often grudgingly, as capable of doing the heavy lifting required to bring about a viable peace process, if it chooses to do so.
A major reason for this is the unique relationship between the United States and Israel and the personal ties between Biden and Netanyahu, strained as those ties are at the moment. In their diplomacy aimed at burnishing relations with the Arab states, Russia and China have by and large neglected to engage with the government of Israel in their diplomatic rounds, to the detriment of their viability as serious interlocutors. Problems of perception and influence also abound. Moscow’s embrace of Hamas in particular did serious damage to its relations with the Netanyahu government, and Putin’s ever more complicated relationship with Iran has begun to make Russia resemble less an effective UN Security Council permanent member than an affiliate of the “Axis of Resistance” rather than the status quo global power it aspires to be. Indeed, very little has been heard from either Russia or China on the Gaza war since early December; they seem largely to have disappeared from the scene, except for occasional flurries of criticism aimed at Israel.
In their diplomacy aimed at burnishing relations with the Arab states, Russia and China have by and large neglected to engage with the government of Israel in their diplomatic rounds, to the detriment of their viability as serious interlocutors.
American Policy Does Moscow’s and Beijing’s Work for Them
But Washington’s obstinate support of Israel’s Gaza campaign and refusal to consider a long-term ceasefire, in the face of mounting casualties and evidence of shocking Israeli indifference to Palestinian deaths, will continue to keep Russia and China relevant in the diplomatic game while putting pressure on the United States. Attempts at taking action in the UN Security Council, repeatedly thwarted or watered down by Washington, are a case in point.
The United States objected to several draft UNSC resolutions and (along with permanent members France and the United Kingdom, as well as others) voted against a Russian resolution in the Council in October that called for a humanitarian ceasefire without condemning Hamas. The United States abstained on a resolution calling for humanitarian pauses in the fighting in November, but on December 8, it once more vetoed a UNSC resolution calling for an immediate, permanent ceasefire, claiming that imposing one before Israel had achieved its aim of destroying Hamas and removing it from power would only ensure future attacks like the one on October 7. A vote on yet another resolution calling for a new humanitarian pause has been postponed as of this writing to see whether there is some formulation Washington will accept. The case for American obstructionism couldn’t have been made better by Wang or Lavrov.
However ineffective Russian and Chinese diplomacy toward Gaza may have been up to this point, they may not need to do much to underscore their central point: that in defending Israel at all costs, with arms supplies and at the United Nations, the United States has shown itself as the enemy of Palestinian aspirations as well as Arab and Islamic sensibilities. As Israel’s war looks less and less like the methodical campaign to dismantle Hamas the Israeli government claims it is waging, and more like an undisciplined, vengeance-driven rampage, the importance of Beijing and Moscow as potential counterweights to Washington is becoming ever more apparent.
Is There an Endgame for the Biden Administration?
As the situation in Gaza has deteriorated, the United States may be reaching the limits of its patience. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III visited Israel on December 18 to underscore the administration’s evolving message that Israel must transition to a more “targeted phase” in the war, and that protection of civilians is a “strategic imperative.” This is an important change of emphasis. But the United States still has a long way to go before it can help to bring about an end to the fighting and set a new course for its Middle East policy. All this is necessary, however, to achieve that elusive peace between Israel and Palestine long sought by so many US negotiators and presidents, and to effectively counter the United States’ chief rivals for influence, China and Russia, who are waiting in the wings.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Twitter/China MFA
