On November 17, 2025, following weeks of diplomatic maneuvering, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to approve Resolution 2803 (2025) in support of the Trump administration’s “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” The resolution, drafted and actively pushed by Washington, received 13 votes in favor and none against, with China and Russia abstaining after their repeated attempts to amend the original draft failed. Throughout the process, the United States enjoyed broad and quite active support from Arab and Muslim states at the UN.
Essentially, UNSC Resolution 2803 welcomes and endorses the Comprehensive Plan and authorizes the transitional governing Board of Peace and its security arm, the International Stabilization Force (ISF), as outlined in the Trump 20-point plan which entrusts both bodies with securing the war-torn Strip, training a new police force, securing the borders, and soliciting international support to begin the formidable task of rehabilitating and reconstructing the devastated territory.
The US administration welcomed the UNSC vote as a political victory, a sign that the international community fully approved its fitful plan for ending the conflict in Gaza and, in the words of US Ambassador Mike Waltz, “charting a new course in the Middle East for Israelis and Palestinians.” Waltz said that, once the ISF became operational, it would “stabilize the security environment—support the demilitarization of Gaza, dismantle terrorist infrastructure, decommission weapons, and maintain the safety of Palestinian civilians.” Waltz’s ambitious list seems like wishful thinking.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s rather overly optimistic assessment of what the UNSC vote means for a peaceful future in the region were not widely shared by other Security Council members or by public opinion in the region. Three major issues present themselves as stumbling blocks.
The first is the absence of credible Palestinian representatives in the process. This absence is significant as the lack of serious and legitimate Palestinian involvement in previous “peacemaking” efforts historically contributed to their demise. It is for this reason that the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN, for example, insisted on the day of the vote that “peace cannot be achieved by bypassing the Palestinians.” The current situation does not depart from the precedents. The proposed eventual participation of a “reformed” Palestinian Authority in the process of governing Gaza also failed to win significant support in the region.
Second, Israeli official statements and policies on “the day after” the Gaza war have not been conducive to building confidence on the Arab side. In highly publicized declarations, the likes of Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich, Minister of Defense Yisrael Katz, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself have all said that Israel will never allow the establishment of a Palestinian state under any circumstances, rendering meaningless such vague hints in the Trump plan or the UNSC resolution. Most Arabs, particularly Palestinians, do not perceive Netanyahu or his government as a potential peace partner. Indeed, this rejectionist attitude is not limited to the current extremist Israeli government. New survey results released by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA) this week reveal that 70 percent of Israelis oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state. In other words, most Israelis are adamantly opposed to the “political horizon” hinted at in the Trump 20-point plan and UNSC deliberations.
Third, as eloquently stated by Brian Brivati, executive director of the Britain Palestine Project, this resolution outright omits the historically established parameters for genuine peacemaking in Palestine. This gap has not helped generate confidence among all parties to move forward. By ignoring such terms of reference as the baseline of the 1967 borders, the illegality of Israeli settlements, the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, the centrality of the United Nations and its institutions, the definition of Palestinian statehood— and more— the process newly endorsed by the UN stands no chance of achieving its professed objectives amid such a high level of ambiguity and vagueness, whether or not intentional.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: flickr/United Nations
