Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed clear satisfaction with the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, quickly congratulating him on X and referring to him as a friend. Erdoğan’s preference for Trump’s victory is not new; he also supported him in 2016 and 2020. This support stems primarily from the Turkish leader’s perception that Democrats place greater emphasis than Republicans do on democracy and human rights—issues that could challenge Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian governance. In the run-up to the 2020 election, candidate Joe Biden even promised to work with the opposition in Turkey to weaken the regime through peaceful and democratic means, a promise that he did not keep as president, but that was still enough for Erdoğan to favor a Trump presidency.
Erdoğan assumes that Trump as president will ignore such concerns and instead focus on pragmatic, transactional relations. Furthermore, Democrats, such as former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and President Biden, are often associated with liberal interventionism, a policy approach that Erdoğan considers interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. In contrast, Trump’s opposition to interventionism aligns with Erdoğan’s preference for reduced American involvement in regions where Turkey seeks greater influence.
Erdoğan’s Personal Approach to Foreign Policy
Erdoğan’s enthusiasm for Trump also stems from the Turkish president’s personalized approach to foreign policy. Like Trump, he favors direct leader-to-leader interactions over institutional frameworks. This approach, evident in Turkey’s warm relations with Russia, underscores Erdoğan’s belief in leader-to-leader diplomacy. Despite conflicting interests in Libya, Syria, the Black Sea, and Ukraine, Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have maintained relatively stable relations, largely due to their personal rapport. In a similar vein, many analysts emphasize the “chemistry” between Erdoğan and Trump, suggesting that their mutual respect and understanding could significantly improve bilateral relations.
Both Erdoğan and Trump hold a strong belief in their own negotiating skills, often presenting themselves as exceptional dealmakers.
Both Erdoğan and Trump hold a strong belief in their own negotiating skills, often presenting themselves as exceptional dealmakers. This self-aggrandizement stems partly from genuine confidence in their abilities and partly from their carefully curated political personas, designed to reinforce their identities as decisive and indispensable leaders. By framing themselves as the only figures capable of resolving various foreign conflicts, both leaders bolster their paternalistic and populist images at home. For Erdoğan, meetings with American presidents particularly bolster his image as a leader of global stature and enhance his domestic political standing.
With Biden, Erdoğan’s strategy of personalism faced significant setbacks. Biden’s deliberate policy of minimizing contact with his Turkish counterpart marked a departure from previous administrations. For the first three months of his presidency, Biden did not contact Erdoğan, which Ankara saw as a snub. When he finally called Erdoğan in April 2021, it was to inform him that the United States would recognize the Armenian genocide the next day, which marked a new US policy stance regarding the Ottomans’ massacre of Armenians in 1915. Despite turbulent events such as Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which increased Turkey’s geostrategic importance as the gateway to the Black Sea and a mediator in the conflict, relations between Biden and Erdoğan did not improve thereafter. Erdoğan even complained openly about his inability to get close to Biden. The American president never hosted Erdoğan at the White House or visited Turkey, becoming the first US president in decades to adopt such an approach.
In contrast, during Trump’s first term, Erdoğan enjoyed unprecedented access to the US president, including having Trump’s personal phone number and communicating with him even during golf sessions. The two leaders met nine times over four years, including Erdoğan’s visit to the White House in November 2019. This dynamic has reinforced Erdoğan’s belief in the effectiveness of personalized diplomacy, a perception that he hopes to revive with Trump’s return to the presidency.
Policy Expectations Under Trump
From a policy perspective, Erdoğan anticipates that a second Trump presidency will reduce US involvement in the Middle East, creating opportunities for Turkey. Erdoğan’s primary focus is on Syria, specifically on ending American military backing for the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that both Washington and Ankara have designated a terrorist organization. Over the last decade, US support for the YPG has become the biggest problem plaguing Turkish-American relations. The partial withdrawal of American forces from Syria during Trump’s first term allowed Turkey to move forward with its goal of establishing a 30-kilometer-wide buffer zone along its border. Erdoğan expects that with Trump’s return, Turkey could push further into Kurdish-controlled areas and neutralize the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
It is unlikely that HTS could launch such a large-scale, well-prepared operation without Turkey’s tacit approval.
After years of unchanging front lines, northern Syria is now experiencing significant upheaval that will likely impact how the United States and Turkey address Syria’s crisis. On November 27, opposition forces led by the Islamist militant group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which controls the Idlib region, launched a military operation against regime forces west of Aleppo. The assault quickly evolved into a series of rapid victories, resulting in the seizure of key territories. Regime forces are currently trying to regroup and slowing downing the advance of HTS and its allies. HTS has taken control of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, effectively pushing regime forces out of northwest Syria. While parts of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have joined the operations, they are neither the primary force behind nor the initiators of this military escalation. Although HTS operates under Turkey’s protective umbrella in Idlib, it cannot be directly labeled as a Turkish proxy, nor does it act entirely on Ankara’s orders. However, it is unlikely that HTS could launch such a large-scale, well-prepared operation without Turkey’s tacit approval. Nevertheless, the quick collapse of regime forces probably was a surprise for Ankara as well.
Meanwhile, Turkish-controlled SNA forces took advantage of this momentum to launch their own offensive, capturing the YPG-held town of Tal Rifaat. While Turkey may not have planned this large-scale escalation, it is clearly trying to capitalize on the developments. As events are still unfolding, it is too early to predict the outcome of the current military escalation, but it is clear that Turkey is trying to strengthen its position in Syria ahead of the arrival of the Trump administration. This will assure it of a better bargaining position on the future of Syria and that of AANES.
Ankara also anticipates that Trump’s promise to end the Russia-Ukraine war could reignite negotiations, enabling Turkey to reassume the mediator role it played during the early stages of the Russian invasion in 2022. While previous mediation efforts stalled due to deadlocked talks, Erdoğan’s government believes this role could be revitalized under Trump. Such a role would enhance Turkey’s international standing and create economic opportunities in post-war reconstruction efforts, with Turkish companies potentially taking a significant share of rebuilding Ukraine. In addition, with the expected easing of tensions between the United States and Russia, Turkey hopes to be freed from the S-400 missile problem and be able to purchase the American F-35 jets. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles in 2017 severely strained Turkish-American relations and led to US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Turkey was also excluded from the F-35 jet program, in which it was a major participant. While it seems unrealistic for Turkey to re-enter the F-35 supply chain, it hopes to at least be able to purchase the jets.
Ankara sees Trump’s strained relationship with European allies as an opportunity to position Turkey as a crucial security partner for Europe. As European trust in American security guarantees wanes due to Trump’s lack of commitment to NATO and the American desire to shift its focus to East Asia and the Pacific, Turkey’s military strength and burgeoning defense sector could become more valuable to Europe. Ankara aims to leverage this potential to improve Turkey’s relations with the European Union, particularly in defense cooperation initiatives like the European Common Security and Defense Policy and Permanent Structured Cooperation, from which Turkey has previously been excluded. Erdoğan’s government bets that a more insecure Europe would better appreciate Turkey’s military prowess and strategic importance.
Populist Parallels and Strategic Differences
Beyond these policy areas, Trump’s election symbolizes a broader victory for right-wing populism, an ideology championed by Erdoğan. The global spread of populist and authoritarian tendencies weakens the appeal of liberal democracy and aligns with the Turkish president’s domestic and foreign agendas. This ideological convergence strengthens Erdoğan’s optimism about working with Trump.
While many are quick to focus on the obvious similarities in the two leaders’ ideological approaches and policymaking and leadership styles, it is also important to recognize their differences. As political analyst Selim Koru rightly points out, Erdoğan is far more competent as a political leader than Trump is. Erdoğan is a focused and hard-working leader, while Trump during his first term appeared to have little interest in meeting the demanding workload that comes with running the world’s superpower. Erdoğan is therefore hoping that he can get what he wants in any direct negotiations with Trump, where there is little institutional oversight and Trump may not be in command of complicated issues. In fact, such a situation happened once before, in 2019, when Erdoğan persuaded Trump to agree to an American withdrawal from Syria, only to have the foreign policy establishment in Washington convince Trump to maintain some US troops in the country. In Trump’s second term, as he consolidates power over US government institutions, there are likely to be far fewer such brakes on Trump’s foreign policy decisions, and Erdoğan will be able to make the most of whatever personal bargains he strikes with the US leader.
Challenges and Overestimated Expectations
At the same time, Ankara’s expectations for the new Trump administration may be overly optimistic. The strong personal affinity between Erdoğan and Trump did not translate into improved Turkish-American relations during Trump’s first term. On the contrary, significant crises emerged, including over Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles. Trump also imposed economic sanctions against Turkey in 2018 over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson, which helped to worsen Turkish economy, including through a rapid depreciation of the Turkish lira. (The United States lifted the sanctions once Turkey had freed Brunson.) In 2019, Trump again threatened economic retaliation against Turkey over its military operation in northeastern Syria, warning Erdoğan not to be “a fool” in a letter that many observers saw as insulting.
Moreover, the difficulties in Turkish-American relations are not just about the lack of communication between the leaders, or the Democrats’ supposed emphasis on democracy and the rule of law, or the poor chemistry between Biden and Erdoğan. There are also structural problems, such as Turkey’s declining geopolitical importance for the United States. First, Turkey is not at the center of the most important issues for the United States in the Middle East. Turkey is not among China’s priority countries in the region, and it is not part of the US-China rivalry there. Second, US dependence on Turkey’s geopolitical position has diminished as Washington has invested militarily in alternative regional partners such as Greece, Cyprus and Jordan due to tense and unpredictable relations with Ankara.
Erdoğan’s failure to engage effectively with the US Congress exacerbates bilateral tensions. The Turkish president seems not to appreciate enough the importance of Congress in American policymaking because of the radical differences between the Turkish and American political systems. Unlike Turkey’s centralized political system, where the dominance of Erdoğan’s party ensures the parliament’s compliance, the US Congress operates independently, often checking presidential authority. His assumption that deals with Trump could bypass Congress underestimates the influence of lawmakers, particularly on contentious issues like the S-400s, human rights, and American support for Kurdish groups. Here, Erdoğan is once again relying on Trump’s ability to undermine institutional checks and balances, hoping that the latter, as a strong man, can and will force Congress to approve his designs.
Persistent Policy Differences
Another wrinkle is that Trump’s second-term cabinet is expected to be aggressively pro-Israel, complicating Erdoğan’s Middle East ambitions. These hawkish officials chosen by Trump may target Erdoğan for his pro-Palestinian rhetoric and support for Hamas, and increase pressure on Turkey to soften its stance. At home, Erdoğan already has been criticized for failing to match his rhetoric on Israeli actions in Gaza with concrete actions. Increased American pressure could exacerbate this tension, leaving Erdoğan caught between domestic expectations and international demands.
Instead of reducing its presence in Syria, the US could entrench itself further in the region to counter Iranian influence.
The prospect of a full US withdrawal from Syria also looks uncertain. A scenario like what happened in Trump’s first term regarding the US military presence could play out in the second one, especially with the number of anti-Iran hawks on Trump’s new national security team. Instead of reducing its presence in Syria, the United States could entrench itself further in the region to counter Iranian influence—and complicate Erdoğan’s buffer zone plans.
In his first term, Trump focused on the Eastern Mediterranean and established closer ties with Greece and Cyprus, but also initiated cooperation between these two countries and Israel. This is something that Turkey perceives as a serious threat, and is a main reason why Turkey has reset its Middle East policies. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), one of the designers of this Eastern Mediterranean policy, is Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, suggesting that Trump may double down on this policy, which is quite uncomfortable for Turkey. Ankara sees Rubio, like former Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), as too supportive of Greece.
Other prominent Trump appointees such as Tulsi Gabbard and Mike Waltz—nominated by Trump to be director of national intelligence and national security advisor, respectively—also have anti-Turkey views. Tulsi Gabbard has accused Erdoğan and Turkey of harboring Islamic State militants during the Syrian civil war. Waltz is known to be very protective of Syrian Kurds. However, Ankara hopes that they will not matter in final policymaking and that Trump will personally decide everything.
While Trump’s policy preferences on geopolitical issues will remain unpredictable, probably the most certain policy dossier for Trump will be his position on global trade and his preference for protectionist policies. A blanket increase in tariffs, as Trump has proposed, could harm Turkish exports and exacerbate existing economic vulnerabilities. So far, this point does not seem to have received due attention in Ankara.
Ankara’s Optimistic Mood May Be Risky
Despite these challenges, Ankara remains optimistic about Trump’s return. Erdoğan’s government believes that Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy and his disdain for institutional constraints could create opportunities for Turkey to bypass traditional policy obstacles. By appealing directly to Trump, Ankara hopes to address longstanding issues like Syria and the S-400 controversy.
But this strategy carries significant risks, as it assumes that Trump’s personal affinity for Erdoğan will override broader institutional and geopolitical realities. Past experiences suggest that overreliance on personal rapport can lead to miscalculations and unmet expectations.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/The White House
