Recent weeks have seen a remarkable shift in European policy on Gaza. After more than 18 months of support for, silence on, or, at the very least, turning a blind eye to, Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and even Germany have ramped up criticism of Israel’s brutal policies, including orchestrated starvation. Other countries have taken diplomatic, legal, and economic measures, indicating that Europe has begun to lift the cover it has provided for Israeli policies in Gaza since 7 October 2023. Spain, Ireland, Slovenia, and Norway, which had already taken a critical stance earlier into the genocide, called for the State of Palestine to be admitted as a full member of the United Nations. In their statement on 28 May 2025, they affirmed their renewed commitment to implementing the two-state solution, a year after their official recognition of the State of Palestine.
This follows official warnings from Paris, London, and Berlin that they will review relations and impose sanctions on Israel, and the joint announcement by seven European countries on 16 May 2025 calling on Israel to immediately end the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and allow unhindered access for humanitarian aid, warning of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Strip. Moreover, escalating tensions between Israel and most European countries have been reinforced by calls to link relations with Israel to its commitment to international law and the rights of the Palestinian people.1
I: Background
The relationship between Western European countries and Israel took shape within the framework of a special strategic partnership, founded on political and historical considerations related to the persecution of Jews in Europe that peaked with the Holocaust, the alliance between Israel and the United States, and intertwined interests in trade, defence, and technology. For decades, European countries have maintained “Israel’s right to self-defence”, avoiding the adoption of clear positions on ongoing Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. This bias became more evident after Operation Protective Edge on 7 October 2023, when the aforementioned major European capitals responded with positions identical to the White House, condemning the attack and emphasizing their support for Israeli military operations aimed at eradicating Hamas’ rule in Gaza. However, the course of the war on Gaza, now in its twentieth month, particularly since Israel broke the ceasefire and resumed its onslaught on 18 March 2025, has exposed civilians to widespread crimes against humanity. Furthermore, Israel is pursuing a policy to block aid and instigate mass starvation. This situation has pressured European governments, leading to a gradual divergence in European positions toward Israel, which can be classified under the two main tendencies explained below.
1. Traditional support based on heritage, armament, and strategic partnerships.
Germany represents the core of this trend, based on its “historical and moral commitment” to Israel, a cornerstone of its “supreme national interest”. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published in April 2025, German military exports to Israel amounted to approximately €326 million in 2023 alone, 33% of total Israeli arms imports.2 These exports include defence components, radar technology, and light and heavy weapons, making Germany the largest European supplier of arms to Israel by far. However, the German position has gradually begun to change, at least rhetorically, due to the escalating massacres in Gaza. In May 2025, Berlin announced that it would not export any weapons used in violation of international humanitarian law. Chancellor Friedrich Merz was reported saying, “the massive military strikes by the Israelis in the Gaza Strip no longer reveal any logic to me – how they serve the goal of confronting terror.”3 In the same context, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul described the situation in Gaza as “unbearable”, adding that “where we see dangers of harm, we will of course intervene and certainly not supply weapons so that there will be further harm”, marking a new precedent in relations with Israel.
Likewise, the UK exported to Israel military equipment, aircraft parts, and radar systems valued at approximately £18 million in 2023. Despite widespread domestic protests against Israel’s devastating assault in Gaza, the British government refused for several months to call for a full ceasefire, contenting itself with supporting “temporary humanitarian pauses”. Although London later joined France and Canada in threatening punitive measures against Israel, it has not yet announced a comprehensive arms export freeze.4 In addition, countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have maintained steadfast support for Israel, driven by their right-wing conservative backgrounds and economic and security partnerships. These countries represent the hard line within the European Union against any punitive measures against Israel and have repeatedly abstained from voting on resolutions condemning the aggression or demanding a truce, emphasizing Israel’s “right to defend itself”.
2. Escalating criticism based on progressive political and legislative positions
In contrast to the pro-Israel camp, an axis of progressive European countries emerged including Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia, later joined by France and Italy. These countries have been distinguished by their more critical stances toward Israeli policies and by their adoption of practical steps, including suspending arms exports, recognizing the State of Palestine, and supporting legal action before the ICJ.
Spain leads the European camp in rejecting Israel’s policies in Gaza, having suspended all military exports to Israel since October 2023 and cancelled existing contracts for the import of Israeli ammunition. Spanish Minister of Social Rights, Ione Belarra, described Israel’s actions in Gaza as a “genocide” and called for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to be tried before the International Criminal Court. In May 2024, Spain formally recognized the State of Palestine and later joined the judicial process in The Hague.5
Ireland and Norway have followed a similar approach, albeit with a less strident tone. They suspended military cooperation with Israel, supported all UN efforts calling for a ceasefire, and recognized the State of Palestine as part of a joint initiative.6 Slovenia later joined this initiative, strengthening the European bloc’s call for a rebalancing of relations with Israel.
The French position gradually evolved from absolute support for the Israeli offensive, which included a call by French President Emmanuel Macron to form an “international coalition” against Hamas, to a sharply critical stance of Israeli policies. He stated on 30 May 2025, that the humanitarian blockade was creating an unbearable situation on the ground, and that “if there is no response that meets the humanitarian situation […], we will have to toughen our collective position”. He called for sanctions against settlers. France also expressed its willingness to recognize the State of Palestine if a just political settlement is not agreed.7
Italy also underwent a shift in its support for Israel. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni revealed to Parliament that her government had effectively frozen all new arms export licenses to Tel Aviv since the outbreak of the war.8 Despite the varying tone of the rhetoric, this axis represents a growing European trend toward taking international law and human rights into account in relations with Israel. It reflects mounting popular and elite pressure on the continent, which could translate into genuine punitive policies in the future. The shift has accelerated since April, as a result of the intensification of the blockade and looming famine in Gaza.
II: European Discourse: From Self-Restraint to Diplomatic Confrontation
Since April 2025, European-Israeli relations have been put to the test, with the conflict of values and interests more prominent than ever before. European discourse on Israel has undergone a qualitative shift driven by the deteriorating humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip, with frequent human rights reports of systematic starvation, deliberate targeting of civilians, especially women and children, and ramped up forced displacement. These developments have placed increasing internal pressure on European governments, driven by massive popular protests and the positions of major human rights and journalistic organizations. This has forced them to reevaluate their traditional relationship with Israel, particularly in light of the contradiction between their rhetoric on international law and their practical positions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The most prominent manifestations of this shift have been:
1. Escalating criticism and the use of diplomatic tools
Many European countries have begun to adopt a more vociferous tone in addressing Israel, going beyond “calls for restraint” to direct threats of punitive measures. On 19 May 2025, Britain, France, and Canada jointly declared that Israel’s continued blockade of Gaza and blocking of aid constitutes a “violation of international humanitarian law”, and threatened to impose sanctions on Israeli officials, an unprecedented move against an ally state.9 This escalation is a telling indicator of the erosion of the political immunity Israel has long enjoyed in its relations with its Western allies.
2. Recognizing the State of Palestine
France and Belgium are considering taking the same major symbolic step taken by Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia, which formally recognized the State of Palestine in May 2024. This comes amid eroding confidence in Israel’s ability to respect political solutions or humanitarian rules in war. According to Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide, “If France moves, several countries will follow”.10
3. Recalling Ambassadors and Reviewing Relations
Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal have taken additional steps, including recalling their ambassadors from Tel Aviv.11 Belgium and Spain have both cancelled previous military and trade agreements with Israel and demanded a review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which grants Israel trade privileges within the European market, despite its repeated violations of the human rights provisions of the agreement.
4. Review of Military Exports to Israel
Since Germany warned against exporting weapons that could be used in potential violations of international law, the German position toward Israel has undergone a rapid shift, culminating in May. Internal and external pressures have mounted, and public support for Israel has fallen to just 12 percent. Tel Aviv is intensifying its diplomatic efforts to prevent Berlin from imposing formal restrictions on arms exports, amid an increasingly critical German tone. Foreign Minister Wadephul confirmed that its relationship with Israel will undergo a thorough legal review and emphasized the need for Germany to adhere to the same principles demanded of other countries, such as Russia. This change in the political and popular mood has been accompanied by civil movements within Germany demanding a halt to arms exports, while the German government faces a growing domestic challenge from coalition parties, some of which have now explicitly called for a halt to arms shipments to Israel. Germany’s unconditional support for Israel is facing an unprecedented test, at a time when questions are growing within Berlin about the limits of this relationship amid the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.12
This European shift demonstrates that the traditional consensus on support for Israel is no longer stable, and that moral and legal considerations are playing a greater role in reshaping relations between European capitals and Tel Aviv, at a time when the latter is becoming increasingly isolated on the global stage.
III: The Prospective Shift in European Positions on Israel
Despite the noticeable shifts in European positions on the Israeli war on Gaza, their repercussions of this these developments for both the Israeli and Palestinian sides remain governed by a number of constraints that limit their actual impact, particularly with continued US support for Israel and the absence of a European consensus on decisive punitive measures. The European Union does not treat Israel as a normal state like any other country; rather, it enjoys numerous privileges in terms of customs duties, visa exemptions, scientific cooperation agreements, and support for Israeli universities. No steps have yet been taken to halt these privileges, let alone impose sanctions. The potential repercussions of the shift in the European position on the Israeli war of extermination on Gaza can be summarized in two main points:
- The shift in the European position weakens the diplomatic cover that the Israeli occupation has long enjoyed in international forums. Some European governments have shifted from explicit defence of Israel to sharp and direct criticism, even threatening unilateral sanctions, especially after growing evidence emerged of the use of starvation as a weapon in Gaza and the refusal to allow humanitarian aid into the country. While this shift does not change the essence of strategic relations with some major powers, such as Germany and France, it creates clear cracks in the traditional Western consensus supporting Israel. Furthermore, a review of the European-Israeli Association Agreement, one of the economic pillars of trade exchange, is now on the table. This could disrupt Israel’s economic plans and deepen its isolation in Western markets, even if it does not escalate as far as immediate or comprehensive cancellation.
- The increasing calls for recognition of a Palestinian state, the return of the Palestinian issue to the heart of official European debate, and the involvement of a number of European countries in legal proceedings against Israel before the ICJ – even if symbolically – enhance Palestinians’ ability to use international law as a tool for political confrontation. Increased recognition of the State of Palestine represents not only diplomatic gain, but also opens the door to expanding legal and institutional representation and pressures governments that have not yet recognized it to reconsider their positions. However, this path remains fraught with obstacles. Most of these countries, especially those that have recognized the Palestinian state, lack direct implementation tools on the ground, nor do they have the power – unilaterally – to stop the war, lift the blockade, or impose a political settlement. Meanwhile, Washington wields the leverage over any negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Its most effective tools remain limited to the symbolic and diplomatic realm, unless the European Union countries decide to transform these positions into actual pressure within the bloc, by suspending agreements or imposing clear conditions on funding joint projects.
Conclusion
The marked escalation in European rhetoric toward Israel, the calls by several European countries to accept a Palestinian state as a member of the United Nations, and the threat by yet more European countries to recognize the State of Palestine, indicate a significant shift in the structure of traditional Western positions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, despite its political implications, this shift remains governed by multiple structural constraints, most notably continued US support for Tel Aviv and its dominance over political negotiations, known as the political or peace process, and the reluctance of some major European capitals to go too far toward punitive measures or reshape the strategic relationship with Israel on new foundations.
* This Paper was published by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies on June 4, 2025.
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