The historically close alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is under strain because of diverging strategic priorities and competition for influence in the Horn of Africa and across the Arab world. The growing friction between these two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members poses a challenge for Washington’s regional objectives. The Trump administration faces the delicate task of managing this tension to prevent bilateral disagreements from escalating into a broader crisis that could weaken GCC cohesion and complicate US efforts to maintain a unified, pro-American bloc in the Middle East.
The United States has a longstanding interest in ensuring that its allies and partners maintain cooperative and functional relationships. In this context, the Trump administration, like its predecessors, views Gulf unity as important to US strategic interests, based on the core assumption that a cohesive and effective GCC can act as a force multiplier for US influence in the Gulf and beyond. By contrast, persistent infighting and deepening divisions within the GCC bloc may impose tangible costs for the United States. These include a diminished capacity to deter Iranian involvement in the Arab world and increased operational complexity for US military activities that rely heavily on coordination, access, and interoperability among GCC states. When Gulf partners are at odds, the effectiveness and efficiency of American security commitments are correspondingly undermined.
Beyond the immediate security implications, Gulf disunity creates openings for adversarial actors to expand their influence in the region. The Saudi–UAE-led 2017-21 blockade of Qatar increased Iran’s leverage in Doha, illustrating how intra-GCC crises inadvertently can advance the interests of US adversaries. Moreover, while rivalries and tensions among Gulf monarchies are an enduring feature of the regional landscape, Washington prefers for these disputes to be managed internally, without requiring sustained US intervention. When the United States is drawn into mediating between Gulf states, as occurred during the first Trump administration’s efforts to defuse the Qatar blockade crisis, it diverts Washington’s diplomatic attention and resources away from pressing global priorities. Ultimately, a more unified and cohesive GCC is not merely a normative aspiration for US policymakers. It is a foundational pillar of US interests in the Middle East.
Diverging Visions of Regional Order: The Saudi–UAE Split Comes into Focus
The Abu Dhabi–backed Southern Transitional Council (STC)’s seizure of large swathes of southern and eastern Yemen in December 2025—and its subsequent loss of that territory to Saudi-backed Yemeni forces in the first days of 2026—was not the origin of the present friction in Saudi-UAE relations. But it laid bare underlying tensions. Significant problems in bilateral affairs stemming from these two GCC states’ divergent foreign policy agendas arguably date back to at least 2018, when Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began pursuing seemingly incompatible strategies in Yemen. Saudi Arabia focused on combating the Houthi rebels while preserving Yemen’s north–south unity, whereas the UAE gradually deprioritized the fight against Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in favor of backing the STC and other southern separatist actors who pose an existential threat to a unified Yemeni state. For years, these conflicting approaches were managed without precipitating a rupture in bilateral ties. However, the STC’s December 2025 advance along Yemen’s northeastern border with Saudi Arabia crossed a “red line,” prompting Riyadh to view both the UAE-backed group and Abu Dhabi itself as threats to the kingdom’s security. This perception informed Saudi Arabia’s decision to launch its December 30 military strikes against the STC at the Port of Mukalla, and to release official statements condemning the UAE in unusually strong language.
The UAE is trying to fragment certain regional states, an approach that risks exposing the kingdom to instability.
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain unresolved after Riyadh-aligned forces loyal to Yemen’s UN-recognized government, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), rolled back the STC’s December 2025 gains, paving the way for the separatist group’s dissolution on January 9, 2026. The proxy rivalry in Yemen has, for now, subsided, but it could easily reignite, particularly as other regional flashpoints—from Israel–Palestine to Syria, Somalia, and Sudan—carry significant potential to exacerbate frictions between the two GCC members.
From Riyadh’s vantage point, the UAE is increasingly aligned with Israel in what some analysts have described as a strategy to fragment certain regional states, an approach that risks exposing the kingdom to instability. By backing the STC in Yemen, by taking steps to legitimize the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, by supporting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and by allegedly fostering ties with Druze separatists in Syria, Abu Dhabi is seen as undercutting efforts by Saudi Arabia—as well as by Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey—to reinforce national institutions in fragile Arab and African states.
Washington’s Cautious Response to Saudi–UAE Friction
The Trump administration has responded cautiously to the recent STC-related developments in southern and eastern Yemen. Rather than taking sides or deepening US involvement, the administration signaled that it viewed the violence between the STC and other Yemeni factions as a matter for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to manage. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforced this posture by publicly praising both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for their “diplomatic leadership” and by urging “restrained and continued diplomacy” to resolve the crisis.
Looking ahead, Washington is unlikely to play a visible role in managing Saudi–UAE tensions. Behind the scenes, however, the Trump administration will likely press both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to prevent their differences from escalating into a new Gulf crisis comparable to the GCC’s 2017–21 Qatar rift, when Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (along with Egypt) severed diplomatic ties and imposed a blockade on Qatar. Reflecting President Donald Trump’s highly transactional approach to Gulf policy—one anchored in leader-to-leader diplomacy and close personal ties with both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed—the White House likely will leverage these relationships to convey a clear message: bilateral frictions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE must not undermine US national interests. These include a cohesive GCC aligned with Washington on key regional and global challenges from Syria to Yemen and from Iran to Red Sea security.
Courting the Trump White House
Valuing its relationships with two of the Arab world’s largest economies, the Trump administration seeks to strengthen Washington’s ties with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Each country’s financial clout, geopolitical influence, and diplomatic engagement make it improbable that the US administration would side with one against the other.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are well positioned to become critical nodes in the global artificial intelligence (AI) and digital infrastructure ecosystem. Their geographical advantages enable efficient data routing, online infrastructure and services, and transmission of AI capabilities between eastern and western markets, elevating the two Gulf countries as the Arab world’s principal AI backbones. Coupled with their substantial energy endowments and deep financial capital, both states are poised to emerge as influential contenders in the global AI competition. Indeed, AI is set to become a central pillar of Washington’s relationships with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, anchoring these partnerships in innovation, technological alignment, and shared progress in the digital age.
At the same time, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are each expected to leverage their strategic importance to persuade the White House to tilt in their favor on the most sensitive and contentious issues in their rivalry. This dynamic is likely to create a delicate balancing act in which the United States must navigate competing pressures while safeguarding its broader interests in regional stability, arms sales, technological cooperation, energy markets, and counterterrorism cooperation. All these goals depend on the United States maintaining strong relationships with both Gulf states.
Competing Narratives of Order and Extremism
With Trump eager to cement his legacy as a deal maker and peacemaker, Riyadh is likely to frame its vision for the Middle East as one that fosters stability and to portray Abu Dhabi as a source of disruption and fragmentation in fragile states. Sudan offers a salient example: Saudi officials have reportedly sought to persuade the Trump administration to pressure the UAE to curb its support for the RSF. Regarding Yemen, as Riyadh hosts a dialogue among southern factions, the kingdom is expected to signal to the White House that its efforts to stabilize the country and to safeguard Yemen’s post-1990 territorial integrity merit robust backing from the West, especially from the United States. Taken together, Saudi Arabia hopes these efforts will position it as the principal guarantor of regional order. At the same time, it will subtly encourage the United States to view the UAE’s actions in fragile states as a complicating factor that must be addressed for any broader peace initiatives to succeed.
The kingdom is expected to signal to the White House that its efforts to stabilize Yemen merit robust backing.
For its part, Abu Dhabi is likely to view the US government’s recent designation of Muslim Brotherhood’s chapters in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan as “terrorist” organizations with satisfaction. The timing of this move is particularly advantageous for the UAE, which seeks to justify some of the more controversial aspects of its foreign policy on the grounds that it is countering the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence. In Yemen, this stance is expressed through the STC’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood-linked al-Islah Party. Concerning Sudan, a pro-UAE talking point is that the paramilitary RSF is fighting what Abu Dhabi frames as “extremist organizations” because the Sudanese Armed Forces contains remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime’s Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements and receives support from Iran. Through this ideological framing, Abu Dhabi can strengthen its standing in Washington. By presenting its regional interventions not simply as geopolitical maneuvers but as part of a shared US–UAE struggle against “violent extremism,” Abu Dhabi embeds its actions within a US policy priority while catering to right-wing American talking points—even if they are outright Islamophobic.
A narrative promoted by certain UAE-aligned voices frames Riyadh’s foreign policy as “promoting” Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated actors. While Saudi Arabia officially designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in 2014, and has publicly welcomed the Trump administration’s terrorist determinations, the UAE seems to be using this moment to distinguish itself in the eyes of Western governments. Abu Dhabi’s message emphasizes that it is more systematic, vigilant, and disciplined than Riyadh in countering perceived Islamist threats, portraying its regional interventions—from Yemen to Sudan—as both principled and strategic.
By casting itself as the more reliable partner in the fight against Islamist influence and the most Israel-friendly Arab state, the UAE seeks to bolster its credibility in Washington and other Western capitals, framing its actions as aligned with shared security priorities and values while implicitly critiquing Saudi approaches as inconsistent or less resolute. With Israeli officials using increasingly harsh language when speaking about Saudi Arabia—a consequence of Riyadh’s refusal to normalize diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv—the pro-Israel lobby in Washington will likely seek to persuade the Trump administration to see the UAE as the United States’ top Gulf partner.
Implications for US Gulf Strategy
The intensifying friction between Saudi Arabia and the UAE underscores the fragility of alliances even among GCC members with historically close ties. Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain allies in name, divergent strategies in Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and beyond reveal contrasting visions of regional order. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity while supporting “legitimate” national institutions in fragile Arab states, whereas the UAE emphasizes ideological and proxy-driven influence via non-state actors in societies vulnerable to high risks of fragmentation.
For the United States, this tension presents a challenge. A cautious, transactional approach may allow Washington to maintain ties with both powers, but risks leaving unresolved conflicts to fester, potentially weakening the GCC as an institution and complicating broader US interests in counterterrorism, energy security, and regional stability. Moving forward, US policymakers must navigate this rivalry carefully, leveraging personal relationships, shared interests, and strategic incentives to prevent further fracturing that would undermine collective Gulf security, while promoting cooperation in fragile states and other contested theaters.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Mohammad Bash
