The Shifting Sands of European Diplomacy: The EU’s Evolving Alignment with Israel

Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically focusing on the period from the Suez Crisis in 1956 to the 2006 Palestinian elections, and extending to recent developments. It argues that while the EU has consistently championed a two-state solution and adherence to international law, its practical alignment with Israel has undergone significant shifts, largely driven by a complex interplay of historical legacies, diverse national interests of its member states, evolving geopolitical realities, and the most recent humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The paper highlights the inherent tensions between the desire for a coherent European foreign policy and the persistent fragmentation caused by divergent national approaches.

Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been a litmus test for the European Union’s (EU) ambition to be a significant geopolitical actor on the world stage. From the Suez Crisis in 1956, which highlighted the nascent European Community’s limited diplomatic leverage, to the more unified (yet often internally divided) stance in the post-Lisbon Treaty period, the EU’s engagement has been characterized by a blend of economic influence, normative declarations, and a persistent struggle for internal coherence. This paper analyzes the shifts in the EU’s alignment with Israel, arguing that while a stated commitment to a two-state solution and international law has been a constant, the degree of practical alignment and critical engagement with Israel has varied significantly, especially under the pressure of evolving circumstances and the enduring weight of national foreign policies. The period from 1956 to 2006 offers a crucial lens through which to understand the formation of the EU’s “balanced” approach, while recent events since October 2023 expose its fragility and the emergence of new, more critical alignments.

From Divergence to the Search for a “Balanced” Position (1956-1980)

The Suez Crisis of 1956 served as an early, albeit stark, illustration of the nascent European Community’s inability to present a unified front on Middle Eastern affairs. France and the United Kingdom, still clinging to vestiges of their colonial past, engaged in a military intervention alongside Israel, while other European nations, particularly West Germany, adopted a more cautious stance, emphasizing economic recovery and transatlantic ties. This period was marked by highly individualized national foreign policies, often reflecting specific historical bonds (e.g., Germany’s post-Holocaust commitment to Israel’s security) or post-colonial interests (e.g., France’s evolving relations with the Arab world).

The 1970s marked a turning point, largely driven by the 1973 October War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo. This energy vulnerability forced European states to recognize the strategic importance of a more coherent and proactive Middle East policy, in which Palestine emerged as a central question. The Venice Declaration¹ of June 1980 emerged as a landmark. For the first time, the European Community adopted a common position that acknowledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the necessity of Palestinian participation in peace negotiations, while also reaffirming Israel’s right to secure borders. This declaration represented a conscious effort to move beyond the Franco-British unilateralism of Suez and establish a “balanced” approach distinct from that of the United States, which was often perceived as unequivocally pro-Israel. This period saw the EU attempting to position itself as a neutral mediator and a normative power,² a proponent of international law, and a significant economic partner to both sides.

However, such a position has led to what Christopher Hill, emeritus Professor at the University of Cambridge, called the Capability-Expectation Gap (CEG).³ Hill concluded already in 1993 that a gap had opened up between the EU’s external capabilities (diplomatic, economic, and normative) and the foreign and internal expectations placed on it.⁴

The Venice Declaration is a good illustration of the CEG. On the capability part, it was revolutionary for its time, recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to be associated with the negotiations, and urging for a comprehensive peace settlement instead of bilateral agreements (like the Camp David Accords). It also became on the expectation side a classic example of the EU’s “words vs. deeds” dilemma. It produced strong words and normative statements, but its practical impact on the ground in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was minimal. It did not fundamentally alter the trajectory of the peace process or compel significant policy changes from either side.

The Oslo Era and the EU’s “Civilian Power” Narrative (1980s-2000s)

The period leading up to and following the Oslo Accords (early 1990s) saw the EU solidify its role as a major financial donor and a supporter of the peace process. Embracing the concept of “civilian power,” the EU sought to promote peace through politics of persuasion⁵ (economic cooperation, institution-building in the Palestinian territories, and diplomatic dialogue). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process, 1995) was a key initiative, aiming to foster stability and economic integration across the Mediterranean basin, including Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

During this era, the EU’s alignment with Israel was characterized by a paradoxical duality: while the EU condemned Israeli settlement expansion and occupation policies in its declarations, its practical engagement through trade, scientific cooperation (e.g., Horizon programs), and political dialogue often implied a de facto normalization that decoupled these activities from significant progress on the ground. The EU-Israel Association Agreement (entered into force in 2000), linking trade relations to respect for human rights and democratic principles (Article 2⁶), became a cornerstone of this relationship. Yet, the effective enforcement of this clause remained highly contentious and rarely triggered.

The internal tensions during this period were numerous and stemmed from several factors. First, the expansion of the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries in the early 2000s brought in new member states with different historical perspectives and sometimes stronger pro-Israel leanings, complicating the achievement of a unified position. Second, the “peace process” narrative, despite its failures, provided a convenient diplomatic framework that allowed the EU to maintain its engagement without taking overtly confrontational steps against Israel, which would risk undermining its own internal cohesion and transatlantic ties. The EU, as a consensus-based organization, often defaulted to the lowest common denominator in its statements, prioritizing unity over a more robust political leverage.

Post-2006 Elections and the Erosion of Consensus: Challenges and Shifting Alignments

The 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which saw Hamas emerge as the unexpected victor, marked a profound rupture in the EU’s established policy toward the Palestinian Authority. Having invested heavily in promoting democratic processes and institution-building in the occupied Palestinian territories,⁷ the EU found itself in a dilemma: how to reconcile its commitment to democratic outcomes with its listing of Hamas as a terrorist organization,⁸ a stance shared with the United States and Israel. Indeed, the EU swiftly sanctioned the very winners of the Palestinian elections despite its financial and political backing for them—which its own Monitoring Team declared to be free, fair, and democratic.⁹

Following Hamas’s unanticipated electoral victory, the Quartet (the EU, the United States, the United Nations, and Russia) imposed three conditions for engagement with the new Palestinian government: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and adherence to past agreements. Hamas refused to accept these conditions, leading the EU, like the US, to suspend direct aid and political contacts with the Hamas-led PA government. While framed as adherence to anti-terrorism principles, this decision had immediate and severe consequences. It triggered a deep humanitarian and political crisis in Gaza, which Hamas largely controlled after the 2007 split with Fateh.¹⁰

Tariq Dana writes that the EU has acted contrarily to its stated rhetoric of fostering democratic institutions and practices, which would have required a constructive engagement with the democratically elected government, rather than seeking to enforce a specific type of stability that ultimately serves the interests of the expansive Israeli settler-colonial structure.¹¹

This decision of the EU also exacerbated existing internal divisions. While a consensus was found to condemn Hamas’s refusal to meet the Quartet conditions, member states held divergent views on the implications of a total boycott. Hardliner countries like the Czech Republic, Germany, and some Eastern European states largely supported a strict “no-contact” policy, prioritizing Israel’s security concerns and the fight against terrorism. Others, more moderate or pragmatic, including Ireland, Spain, and the Nordic countries, advocated for continued engagement, fearing that isolating Gaza would further destabilize the region, alienate the Palestinian population, and undermine any future peace prospects. They argued for a more nuanced approach, distinguishing between Hamas’s political and military wings, or focusing on humanitarian needs irrespective of the political leadership.

This period starkly underscored the limitations of the EU’s self-proclaimed “civilian power” approach. While the EU excelled at providing financial aid and fostering institution-building, its model struggled when confronted with an elected political actor it deemed illegitimate due to its armed wing and ideology. The emphasis on “normative conditioning” (linking aid to democratic principles and non-violence) proved ineffective in transforming Hamas and instead contributed to the fragmentation of Palestinian governance and the deepening of the Gaza crisis. The EU became a significant “payer” but its political “player”¹² leverage was severely hampered by its inability to engage with the de facto governing authority in Gaza.

Beyond the initial rupture of 2006-2007, the subsequent years (2008-2014) were marked by recurrent escalations of violence in Gaza and the relentless expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. Each major military operation (e.g., Cast Lead in 2008-09, Pillar of Defense in 2012, Protective Edge in 2014) put immense strain on EU unity and exposed the limitations of its foreign policy tools. The EU consistently reiterated its commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, deeming Israeli settlements illegal under international law and a major obstacle to peace. Numerous EU declarations, Council conclusions, and Heads of Mission reports (e.g., on Area C, East Jerusalem, and settler violence) condemned this expansion.

However, these condemnations were rarely followed by concrete actions. Despite its robust rhetoric, the EU consistently demonstrated an inability to enforce its own resolutions or effectively pressure Israel for compliance. The EU-Israel Association Agreement, with its critical human rights clause (Article 2), was rarely, if ever, seriously leveraged as a tool for diplomatic or economic influence. This striking disconnect between words and action fueled growing frustration within parts of the EU and among civil society organizations. Critics increasingly pointed to the Union’s “punching below its weight,” arguing that its significant economic and diplomatic potential remained largely untapped. This inaction was particularly stark given emerging shifts, such as Hamas’s declaration in its 2017 political program to accept a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, which implicitly signaled a move toward a two-state solution and a less overtly military confrontation with Israel—a shift that the EU’s rigid policy largely failed to acknowledge or engage.¹³

Finally, the period following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and particularly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, brought the “double standards” argument into sharp relief and demonstrated the mobilization of two different imaginaries of Europe.¹⁴ The EU’s swift, comprehensive, and robust response to Russia (imposing extensive sanctions, providing military aid to Ukraine, condemning annexation) contrasted starkly with its comparatively hesitant and largely rhetorical approach to Israeli violations of international law, including occupation and settlement expansion. This perceived inconsistency undermined the EU’s normative credibility on the global stage, particularly in the Global South, and fueled internal debates within the EU itself.

This erosion of consensus and the growing perception of ineffectiveness underscored a critical challenge for the EU: how to move beyond declaratory foreign policy and translate its stated values and principles into meaningful action, especially when faced with an entrenched conflict where its major partner (the United States) often holds a different and less critical position. The stage was set for the even more profound and divisive reactions that would follow the events of October 2023.

The Ongoing Gaza War and the Realignment of European Policies

The most recent war in Gaza, following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, has triggered a profound, albeit still evolving, shift in the EU’s alignment with Israel, exposing and further deepening the already existing internal rifts. Initial reactions saw widespread condemnation of Hamas and strong solidarity with Israel, often accompanied by reaffirmations of Israel’s right to self-defense¹⁵ (e.g., statements by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission). However, the escalating humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the immense civilian death toll, and Israel’s continued obstruction of humanitarian aid have led to a recalibration of positions among many European states twenty months after the beginning of the war. In this section, we try to highlight the reasons for the shift in EU policy since October 7, 2023.

Since the Hamas attacks, Israel has had the unconditional backing of European states, who have blocked any attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Israeli government. In effect, the EU has restricted its response to repeated communiqués voicing “disquiet” and “concern” over a highly asymmetric war—where a military superpower confronts a besieged civilian population—yet has consistently refrained from implementing any concrete measures.¹⁶

When in February 2024, Spain and Ireland called for a revision of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, a call supported by then-EU’s head diplomat, Josep Borrell, the Commission stayed silent. But one year and three months later, the Dutch Initiative ¹⁷ to formally review Article 2 of the Agreement was taken seriously. There are several reasons that can explain this change in the European diplomatic strategy:

The shift in Israeli policy since the breach of the ceasefire in March 2025 that even the hardline defenders of Israel could not ignore, constitutes probably the most salient one. Indeed, Israeli policy has shifted toward a renewed and intensified military offensive, a total blockade of humanitarian aid leading to a catastrophic famine,¹⁸ a hardened diplomatic stance against international pressure and previous ceasefire terms, and an increased push for policies that aim for widespread displacement and control over Gaza. On March 18, Israel issued over 30 forced displacement orders¹⁹—impacting vast areas of Gaza and causing hundreds of thousands of people to be displaced multiple times, pushing civilians into increasingly smaller and pulverized enclaves.

Since late March 2025, Israel has also explicitly banned all United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) international staff from entering the Gaza Strip, and the Knesset passed two laws in October 2024 (effective March 2025) to prohibit the agency’s operations in “Israeli territory” and bar contact with Israeli officials. This has further crippled aid efforts, as UNRWA is a primary aid provider. The sheer scale of suffering and death²⁰ in Gaza has compelled traditionally pro-Israel EU members to demand an immediate ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access.

In fact, these developments in Israeli politics are not surprising to those who have listened to the far-right discourses of rightwing Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Speaking at a conference hosted by the far-right Israel Hayom newspaper in early August 2024, the latter already said that it “might be justified and moral” to starve Gazans to death.²¹

Besides Gaza, concerns also grow amongst the EU member states over the fate of the West Bank, where Israel announced the creation of 22 new colonies on May 29, 2025.²² Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz promised to build an “Israeli Jewish State.” Such declarations show that it is no longer about neutralizing Hamas²³ or bringing home the Israeli hostages; it is about eradicating or displacing the Palestinians to annex their territory. Such declarations are not anecdotal; they constitute admission of genocidal intent the risk of which the EU could not take.

Additionally, the provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)²⁴ regarding alleged genocide in Gaza, and the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) consideration of arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, as well as Nicaragua’s instituted proceedings against Germany for complicity in genocide at the ICJ, may explain the European states’ changing stance vis-à-vis Israel.

A second crucial factor is the recognition of Palestinian statehood by several European member states. Most notably, Spain, Ireland, and Norway (although it is not an EU member, it is closely aligned in foreign policy) formally recognized the State of Palestine in May 2024. This move, while largely symbolic, powerfully signals a growing frustration with the stalled peace process and a firm belief that a two-state solution cannot be achieved without acknowledging Palestinian statehood. Other EU members, including Malta, Slovenia, and France—which has indicated it is also considering such a step—²⁵are exploring similar paths. This highlights a key tension: while the EU officially supports a two-state solution, it remains profoundly divided on the timing and method of recognizing Palestinian statehood, as such decisions are primarily national prerogatives.

A third element to consider is the European public opinion, which has become even more critical of Israel’s military actions since March 2025 due to the length and devastating impact of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. Public support and sympathy for Israel in western Europe has even hit the lowest level ever recorded by a recent YouGov survey,²⁶ with fewer than a fifth of respondents in six countries holding a favorable opinion of the country. Large-scale, sustained pro-Palestinian protests across major European cities have multiplied over the past months, and more and more Jewish figures, such as the French female rabbi, Delphine Horviller,²⁷ have voiced their concerns over Israel’s political rout and moral bankruptcy. This groundswell of public anger over the situation in Gaza directly pressures national governments, who are accountable to their electorates.

Fourth, a shift in tone is also perceptible in the media. More and more mainstream newspapers now talk about genocide in Gaza and mention the possibility of sanctions against the State of Israel. Even in the Financial Times, the paper of the British Business class, Martin Sandbu, the journal’s EU economics commentator, has been recommending sanctions on Israel for the first time in June 2025. He writes: “[I]t is time for Europe to clarify specifically how it might place sanctions on Israel, and to develop its ad hoc sanctions decisions into a systemic policy framework for how to use this geoeconomic tool generally. […] Banking and financial sanctions are most likely to be inefficient […]. The hardest hitting sanctions would probably be on trade and travel. Israel sources nearly half of its goods imports from Europe and sends more than a third of its exports to the continent.”²⁸

The interplay of these identified elements accounts for the crystallization of a shared European position on the conflict, which subsequently found concrete expression in the decision to reassess the association agreement. Nevertheless, it is imperative to analyze whether this revision truly signifies a fundamental alteration in policy direction or merely constitutes a symbolic recalibration.

Continuities Behind Rhetorical Shifts

Despite these visible evolutions and shifts in rhetoric, a critical analysis suggests that the fundamental underlying position of Europe toward Israel has not, in essence, undergone a complete paradigm shift.

While the EU theoretically possesses the power to suspend the association agreement, this remains a last resort and currently lacks the necessary unanimous consensus among all member states. Despite mounting pressure and the escalating humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the idea of suspension remains taboo for several countries, including Germany, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic.²⁹ This is partly due to the specific character of the Union’s foreign and security policy, which is primarily intergovernmental and requires unanimity among member states and Israel’s bilateral relations with individual European countries, which tend to be very emotional and ideological.³⁰

The growing influence and alignment of European far-right political factions with the Israeli far-right government, is a good case in point. They share emphasis on national sovereignty, a skeptical view of multilateral institutions, and a focus on security narratives. Their anti-immigration stance, combined with rising Islamophobia, translate into a reluctance to criticize Israel. Parties like Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the German AFD Party, and Spain’s Vox instead portray Israel as a democratic bastion and a key ally in defending “western values” against perceived threats from radical Islam. This narrative allows them to frame their support for Israel as a defense of broader European interests.

For countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán, cultivating strong bilateral ties with Israel serves a strategic purpose, often to counter perceived Western European liberal dominance within the EU or to forge alliances outside traditional EU frameworks. This leads to a consistent defense of Israeli actions within EU councils by Hungary.

The dynamics of these far-right alliances introduce a significant variable into the EU’s foreign policy calculus. Their ability to block unanimous decisions, even when a significant majority of member states are in favor, highlights the inherent limitations of the EU’s common foreign and security policy when confronted with deeply entrenched national interests and ideological alignments.

Besides, Europe’s economic dependence on Israel should be considered, given its €46.8 billion annual trade relationship with the Israeli state. The defense industry is undoubtedly the linchpin of EU-Israel trade, accounting for 41.9 percent of EU exports to Israel. Companies like Elbit Systems, BAE Systems, and Rheinmetall have thrived as regional tensions fueled demand for military hardware.³¹

Europe’s dependence on Israeli gas since the Ukraine war should also be considered. On June 15, 2022, the EU signed an agreement to import Israeli natural gas.³² The energy crisis triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine forced Europe to rapidly diversify its gas supplies. Israeli gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean (e.g., Leviathan, Karish) have become a strategic interest. While not a massive proportion of EU total gas imports, they represent nevertheless a secure and proximate alternative. This energy dependency therefore creates a powerful incentive to maintain stable and cooperative relations with Israel, potentially limiting the EU’s willingness to impose significant punitive measures.

The role of Israel within large geostrategic projects, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC Project) is also another hint toward the maintenance of strong relations between Israel and EU member states.³³ The IMEC project, launched in September 2023, aims to establish a vast economic corridor connecting India to Europe via the Middle East, including a crucial land bridge through Israel (e.g., Haifa port). This initiative is seen as a strategic counter-balance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and a long-term investment in global trade routes. Israel’s integral role in this multi-billion dollar project means that key European powers, particularly France, have a vested strategic interest in Israel’s stability and participation, which could override calls for stronger punitive action.

Other European states also maintain deep-seated bilateral security, intelligence, and even military cooperation with Israel. This discreet but vital relationship often operates outside the purview of public EU statements and is highly valued by national security establishments. Such deep-rooted cooperation makes a fundamental break with Israel highly unlikely for many European capitals.

A fourth element is memorial weight, heavily determining the approaches of individual member states. For countries like Germany, the unique historical responsibility stemming from the Holocaust continues to shape their foreign policy toward Israel, often translating into an unwavering commitment to its security. While even Germany has shown increased criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza,³⁴ this foundational element acts as a strong brake on any move toward genuinely antagonistic policies. This can also be seen in the recent debate over a possible reconsideration of arms exports to Israel by Germany, which Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul dismissed on June 4, stating that “Germany will continue to support Israel, including with weapons deliveries.”³⁵ Wadephul also clearly spoke out against a quick recognition of a Palestinian state, as had been suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron.

These elements make us believe that the announced revision of the EU-Israel Association agreement will mainly remain largely “symbolic measures” such as the suspension of academic projects (such as Horizon Europe or Erasmus+) or the halting of the “Open Sky” agreement, which liberalized air transport between the two parties. Such measures do not directly punish the Israeli government.

Conclusion

The European Union’s alignment with Israel has undergone a complex transformation since 1956. From initial national divergences, it evolved toward a “balanced” common position embodied by the Venice Declaration and the civilian power approach of the Oslo era. However, this balance has been continuously tested by the realities on the ground, the internal heterogeneity of EU member states, and the inherent limitations of a consensus-driven foreign policy.

Twenty long months after the beginning of the Gaza war, a discursive re-alignment, pushing several EU member states toward more critical positions vis-à-vis Israel, including the recognition of Palestine and the consideration of economic leverage, is perceptible. This shift is driven by the sheer scale of the humanitarian catastrophe, mounting pressure from international legal bodies, and a growing domestic outcry.

However, despite these evolutions and the genuine outrage expressed by many European actors, the fundamental structural position of Europe toward Israel has not radically changed. The European stance, particularly in the aftermath of the Israeli military action targeting Iran on June 13, 2025, vividly illustrates this pattern. Many European heads of state and governments were quick to articulate their unwavering support for Israel. As an example, French President Emmanuel Macron explicitly declared, “France reaffirms Israel’s right to protect itself and ensure its security.” Concurrently, Germany’s Foreign Minister Wadephul publicly acknowledged Israel’s inherent right to territorial and civilian defense. This unfolding conflict with Iran emerges as a potentially strategic move by the Israeli government, initiated at a time when Prime Minister Netanyahu’s international standing appears to be diminishing. By engaging in direct confrontation with Iran, Israel has effectively re-secured significant European support. Moreover, this escalation serves to de-prioritize the Palestinian issue on the global diplomatic agenda, a development also facilitated by the deep distrust of Iran prevalent among several Arab governments in the Gulf region.

All this shows that underlying strategic interests, such as the diversification of energy imports (especially Israeli gas post-Ukraine war) and the geopolitical importance of Israel within the region and within large-scale infrastructure projects like IMEC, continue to anchor the EU-Israel relationship. These economic and strategic dependencies, coupled with strong bilateral ties and the inherent structural constraints of EU foreign policy-making, often limit the extent to which the EU can translate its rhetorical shifts and moral concerns into a more robust and unified political leverage.

That said, it might also be dangerous to overestimate the importance that a hardening of the European tone might have on the Netanyahu government. Not only do Israeli authorities not care, such international condemnations are often reframed by the Israeli government as evidence of strategic isolation, reinforcing its current hardline posture. All of this shows the Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben Gvir triad that their country can only rely on itself, as it is, as always, misunderstood and surrounded by enemies.

Acknowledging the geopolitical complexities, Europe faces a critical juncture where the imposition of sanctions against the Israeli state becomes imperative to safeguard its normative influence and moral credibility. The current Israeli government’s actions have not only demonstrably destabilized regional and international geopolitical equilibria and contravened European foundational values, but they also inadvertently contribute to the observed rise in global anti-Semitism. Consequently, a comprehensive European strategy for combating anti-Semitism must include a consideration of targeted sanctions against the policies of the Israeli far-right government.

The acceptance of these challenging truths mandates the resolute deployment of the European Union’s existing instruments of influence; instruments not uncommonly utilized against other international actors. The trajectory of the EU’s global standing will be contingent upon its demonstrated capacity to reconcile its persistent strategic imperatives with its declared fidelity to international law and human rights.

The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.