Of the three interrelated levels of conflict at play in Yemen—local, regional, and international—it was the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that flared up in armed clashes across the south of the country in December 2025, with the unrest continuing into 2026. The Saudi–Emirati conflict assumed a proxy war dimension between militias supported by Saudi Arabia under the command of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and groups backed by the UAE including the Southern Transitional Council (STC). In December 2025, the STC conquered the Hadramawt and Mahra governorates that border Saudi Arabia, but by mid-January 2026 it was beaten back by PLC forces and the STC faction led by Aidarous al-Zubaidi was disbanded.
The UAE’s ambitions to control strategic locations in southern Yemen by supporting renegade militias have now effectively ended, as the UAE has announced the withdrawal of its remaining forces from the country. The current conditions on the ground mean that the Emirates can no longer control the Bab al-Mandab waterway at the entrance to the Red Sea, or even the Socotra Archipelago in the Gulf of Aden. Instead, the ball now appears to be in the Saudi court. Riyadh will have to decide future steps not only inside Yemen but also across the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea—areas of critical strategic value to the kingdom and globally.
Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened as partners in 2015 to halt Houthi (Ansar Allah) advances on South Yemen—and to oust the group from Yemen’s capital Sanaa—the two countries diverged in other ambitions. Riyadh lent its support to the government of then-President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party, while Abu Dhabi turned to forming militias as an alternative way to further its interests. To that end, the UAE imported and funded fighters from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to assist its proxies in Yemen. RSF involvement in Yemen surfaced in 2017 when the militia’s leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) admitted to losing several hundred soldiers fighting the Houthis there. More recently, reports from the United Nations and international watchdog groups point to UAE military support for the RSF during the current Sudan war.
In addition to the STC—the strongest UAE-backed forces in South Yemen—Abu Dhabi helped establish the Giants Brigade, which has now taken over security in Aden after the STC’s forced retreat. The UAE also helped create the Security Belt Forces, the Elite Forces, and the National Resistance Forces (NRF), the last of which occupies a strategic region south of Hodeidah governorate and the Mokha port along the Red Sea and is led by close UAE affiliate Tareq Saleh, nephew of Yemen’s late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Most of the UAE’s own forces, numbering at least 1,500 soldiers, had pulled out of Yemen in 2019, leaving a small contingent of advisers and trainers. The recent UAE withdrawal announcement in response to Saudi threats over STC separatist moves does not necessarily deprive it of all influence in Yemen, since it may retain the loyalty of the Yemeni forces that it established. Emirati influence in Yemen thus could conceivably continue alongside that of Saudi Arabia should the two nations reach an understanding on their end goals in the country. Absent such an understanding, Riyadh could push Abu Dhabi out of Yemen completely and stamp out the secessionist drive in South Yemen. In the long term, Saudi Arabia could use its rapprochement with Iran and the reinvigoration of the PLC to revive the peace roadmap for Yemen advocated by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg.
Over the past decade, the UAE has attempted to establish a sphere of influence from Libya to the Horn of Africa, a goal that its signing of the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020 has advanced. Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Israel has produced security and technology deals and joint naval exercises. All indications are that the two countries share a similar security vision for the region, including installing friendly regimes such as the one that the UAE had been preparing to install in South Yemen. UAE outposts have appeared off the Yemeni coast in the form of military runways and seaports on Socotra Island and on Mayoun and Abdel Kuri Islands in the Bab al-Mandab passage. Combined with Emirati bases in the Horn of Africa, such outposts give the UAE a security presence at the entrance to the Red Sea and in the Arabian Sea. In this respect, while retreating from Yemen is no doubt a setback, it does not change the UAE’s overall strategy—unless there is a change of heart or of leadership at home.
The STC takeover of Hadramawt and Mahra clearly crossed what the Saudi leadership felt was a red line for its border security. This red line also has a maritime dimension. The kingdom could perceive UAE–Israel security and intelligence collaboration as a threat to its own commerce and freedom of navigation—a concern that it may share with other regional players such as Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. Now that Saudi Arabia has reasserted its authority in Yemen, the UAE may be facing a fork in the road. It may need to choose to remain inside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) under Saudi leadership, or to opt out and continue pursuing regional expansion in collaboration with the United States and Israel.
The Trump administration surely is torn between its lucrative friendship with Saudi Arabia and the goals that it shares with Israel and the UAE in the framework of the Abraham Accords. Thus far, Washington has counseled de-escalation and diplomacy between its two regional allies, but does not appear willing to apply heavy pressure to either party. But if the Saudi–Emirati relationship unravels further, the United States may have to play a more decisive role in finding necessary common ground between these important allies.
The Saudi–Emirati divergence of interests and strategy in Yemen has set back common GCC action, at least temporarily. In principle, as the preeminent members of the Gulf alliance, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have a responsibility to maintain regional cohesion. The latest developments in Yemen provides a cautionary note for potential future unilateral action by the UAE, and conveys a lesson in how unbounded ambition can negatively affect collective security at a dangerous moment for the region.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Mohammed Al-wafi
