In May 2025, Syria’s transitional President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, confirmed that his government was in indirect communication with Israel, the first time the two sides had talked since 2010, before the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011. The new round of contact apparently was aimed at securing Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory and from the demilitarized buffer zone between the two countries that it occupied after the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime, as well as ending Israeli airstrikes on Syria. Yet Israel’s I24NEWS outlet subsequently reported that the talks had also included the terms of a possible peace deal between the two countries, under which Damascus might be prepared to give up claims to the occupied Golan Heights in exchange for large parts of northern Lebanon being ceded to Syria. However illogical and unreasonable this report sounds, it has raised serious concerns in Lebanon about the potential revival of old claims long abandoned by the Syrian state.
These reports provoked great controversy in Lebanon, especially because these claims have been dormant and effectively abandoned since the two countries’ independence in the 1940s. Lebanon is already in a heightened state of political sensitivity following renewed pressure from the United States for the disarmament of Hezbollah, whose military and political strength has been sorely weakened by the Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Iran. Tensions worsened after US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said that Beirut’s inability to deliver Hezbollah’s disarmament risked Lebanon becoming subordinate to regional powers, a situation that Barrack characterized as a potential return to “Bilad al-Sham” (a historical term for the eastern Mediterranean from the Taurus Mountains to the Sinai Desert that would comprise present-day Lebanon, Palestine, and much of Israel, as well as western Syria, Jordan, and part of southern Turkey). Following I24NEWS reports of secret talks envisaging the division of Lebanon, Barrack’s faux pas was seized upon by partisan media and fringe voices in Lebanon who raised alarm at the potential restoration of Syrian suzerainty over the country that was in place from the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1991 until Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.
While Barrack quickly walked back his comments and Syrian officials never confirmed that they had ever discussed trading the Golan for northern Lebanon, a Lebanese national consensus that the country’s borders were not up for negotiation quickly emerged. The political anxieties provoked by this episode say much about the ongoing fragility of relations between Syria and Lebanon—and about the tensions characterizing Lebanese politics following the fall of the Assad regime.
Legacies of Occupation
Israel occupied Syria’s Golan Heights during the 1967 Six-Day War and effectively annexed them in 1981. The occupied Golan was never internationally recognized as Israeli territory until the first Trump administration did so in 2019. For Israel, returning the Golan Heights to Syria is categorically off the table. Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel expanded its control beyond the 1974 agreement zone and moved north into Mount Hermon, which oversees Damascus, as well as swaths of three southern Syrian governorates.
In addition to being a key strategic piece of land, the Golan Heights are important to Syria because of their water resources, including the eastern shore of the Galilee. Under the Assad regime, the goal of reclaiming the Golan was central to regime legitimacy and was a justification for militarization. While formally maintaining Syria’s claim to the Golan, the new Damascus leadership appears more pragmatic and open to a diplomatic resolution with Israel with the help of the United States.
The legacies of Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon (1978-2000) also continue to shape Lebanese politics. Hezbollah was founded in reaction to the occupation and retained its arms at the end of the civil war on the grounds it was a resistance movement, rather than a militia. Hezbollah used a similar rationale of needing to “protect Lebanon” from Sunni jihadist groups during the Syrian civil war. After the demise of the Assad regime, alongside which Hezbollah fought for many years, the idea that the al-Sharaa government may have designs on Lebanese territory gives a further argument for the Shia group to keep its arms to shield the country from a rising Sunni Islamist power in Damascus.
Lebanese politics are also shaped by memories of the Assad regime’s history in the country.
Lebanese politics are also shaped by memories of the Assad regime’s history in the country. From 1976 until 2005, Syria maintained a heavy military and political presence in Lebanon under the pretext of stabilizing the country during and after its civil war. This intervention evolved into a full-scale occupation, with tens of thousands of Syrian troops deployed across Lebanon. Damascus exerted decisive control over Lebanese politics, security, and foreign policy. The Syrian regime’s role in suppressing dissent, in manipulating elections, and in orchestrating assassinations—most notably of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005—left deep scars on Lebanon’s national psyche. For many Lebanese, especially for those who lived through that era, Syria’s influence remains synonymous with coercion.
Realistically, the threat of any renewed Syrian occupation is remote, considering the challenges already facing the new leadership in Damascus. Such challenges include its failure to initiate a democratic transition, to secure internal stability, or to rein in its factions, and its proclivity for overreaction, especially against minority communities (Kurds, Druzes, and Alawis), or, even more fundamentally, to build credible state institutions. It is difficult to conceive of any serious set of conditions that would allow Syria to assert itself in Lebanon. Yet such fears are understandable in light of past experiences of occupation that continue to loom large in the minds of many Lebanese.
Provocation and Response
Lebanese fears of new Syrian irredentism were stoked by marginal voices that provoked anxiety in their interventions online. The former Syrian opposition figure, Kamal Labwani, controversial in Lebanon for his inflammatory positions, was one of the most vocal in quickly fanning the flames. In an interview with the Lebanese online television channel Spot Shot, Labwani proclaimed Lebanon “a historical lie” and “a geographical mistake,” arguing that the country should be dissolved and incorporated into a “New Syria”—presumably with considerable demographic shifts as well as concessions to Israel.
Such provocations had the potential to strike a chord with some parts of Lebanese society. After decades of neglect, regions like Tripoli and Akkar are socially and economically marginalized and susceptible to radical alternatives. Nevertheless, responses reflected a broad national consensus that Lebanon’s borders are final and not up for negotiation. Political agreement on the issue has been swift and broad-based. Not one Lebanese party or movement endorsed the idea of partition, reaffirming a national consensus over identity and belonging.
Parties across the Lebanese political spectrum, including the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb, and the Free Patriotic Movement, publicly condemned the rhetoric as an affront to Lebanese sovereignty. Even ideological pan-Arabists and supporters of a “Greater Syria” that includes Lebanon have come to accept the existence of two independent states: Veteran Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt rejected Barrack’s comments outright and reaffirmed his commitment to borders defining what he described as the “current entities,” and even the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)—whose founders envisioned a Greater Syria—reaffirmed that the Lebanese army is a “symbol of national unity.” Hezbollah and Amal, considered close to the Assad regime, did not react directly. In the meantime, a panoply of independent political voices and civil society activists expressed concern that the prospect of renewed Syrian involvement would destabilize Lebanon at a time when it was trying to tackle urgent priorities.
Regional and International Consensus
Although the Syrian government did not explicitly deny reports that it was discussing a deal to take over parts of Lebanon, any territorial revisionism would alienate regional and international allies.
Middle Eastern states, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, have firmly reiterated that Syria’s reintegration depends upon upholding sovereignty and the inviolability of post-colonial borders. These states have also consistently supported Lebanon’s territorial integrity, and they support the rehabilitation of both Lebanon and Syria in their efforts to regain territorial control, to rebuild institutions, and to address crises caused by regional instability. The finality of Lebanon and Syria’s geographic boundaries is not only a diplomatic reality; it is also a practical imperative that regional actors have no appetite to challenge.
Similarly, the United States has long supported Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Washington has been the main financial backer of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the sole legitimate defender of Lebanese territory and has invested heavily in the LAF’s capabilities. The United States opposes the presence of armed non-state actors in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah, which it sees as a proxy for Iran and has designated as a terrorist organization. The US government would also view a revival of Syrian territorial claims as a direct threat to regional stability and as an unacceptable rollback of Lebanese sovereignty. France, which had a colonial role in shaping both Lebanon and Syria, is another outspoken supporter of Lebanese sovereignty. French officials historically have warned against attempts to undermine the legal and diplomatic status of Lebanon as a separate entity. Paris would see such claims as a dangerous provocation.
Toward a Constructive Bilateral Relationship
Although regional and international stakeholders have reaffirmed their position on the finality of Lebanon’s and Syria’s borders, Lebanon’s concerns for its continued independence underscore the urgent need to resolve outstanding issues in bilateral relations.
Speculations about a potential resurgence of Syrian influence in Lebanon—coupled with the absence of a firm denial from Damascus—have threatened to derail already fragile efforts at improving relations between the two countries. In March 2025, the Lebanese and Syrian defense ministers notably signed an agreement aimed at demarcating the border with a view to curbing rampant smuggling and other illicit cross-border activities. This agreement was particularly significant because it came at a time when the LAF was intensifying its efforts to reassert control over Lebanon and to establish a monopoly on arms, efforts that had long been undermined by Hezbollah’s active presence on both sides of the frontier during the Syrian civil war.
Though officially defined and legally recognized, much of the Lebanese-Syrian border remains un-demarcated.
The most important task today is to complete the delineation of borders between the two countries. Though officially defined and legally recognized, much of the Lebanese-Syrian border remains un-demarcated—that is, not marked physically. Some of the rugged, mountainous border terrain is especially dotted with disputed zones and by incomplete state control. Demarcation could become a cornerstone in a broader effort to help the Lebanese government reclaim full sovereignty and curtail the influence of non-state actors like Hezbollah. If undertaken seriously, this step could lay the grounds for reasserting state authority in areas where groups like Hezbollah have operated with impunity. But to succeed, it would also need to be accompanied by deployment of the LAF and internal security forces to police crossings and to clamp down on illicit movement of arms and drugs. This is where international assistance can play an important role.
Closely tied to this is the issue of the return of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, one of the most sensitive bilateral issues. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Lebanon has hosted more than 1.5 million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees, an influx that has further strained Lebanon’s fragile economy, has weakened public infrastructure, and has exacerbated tensions in host communities. While many Lebanese view their return as urgent, conditions within Syria remain unsafe, and forced repatriation would violate international law. More effective border governance, however, could help to facilitate more orderly, voluntary returns while reassuring Lebanese public that the state is regaining control over its territory. Similarly, bilateral security cooperation, with support from international actors, could help develop a framework for vetting, monitoring, and eventually reintegrating returnees into Syria.
Unfortunately, cooperation between the two countries has been undermined by the failure of Syria’s new leadership to counter recent talk of territorial revisionism. This silence creates antagonism from its neighbor to the detriment of both countries’ interests. Even more troublingly, al-Sharaa’s inaction has reinvigorated concerns that the rise of a Sunni Islamist regime in Syria might represent an existential threat to minorities in Lebanon. Anxieties grounded in Lebanon’s religious diversity have sharpened fears that the new Syrian order could adopt expansionist or hegemonic ambitions in the future.
The only viable path forward for Syria’s leadership is to reject, clearly and publicly, any claims or insinuations that infringe on Lebanese sovereignty. Such rejection should be followed by active engagement on the full range of bilateral issues—including border demarcation, security cooperation, and refugee return—to reset the relationship on a basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect. Anything less risks continuing the same patterns of coercion and mistrust that have haunted Syrian-Lebanese relations for decades.
Featured image credit: X/Syrian Presidency
