Raison d’État, Germany, and the Israeli War on Gaza

On October 10, 2024, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock gave a speech that revived the debate around Staatsräson, or raison d’état (reason of state), asserting that Israel’s security is an integral part of German foreign policy. Her remarks perfectly illustrated the complexity and scope of this concept, which sometimes allows states to go beyond the usual legal and moral norms in the name of national security (and in the German case, the security of another state). The aim of this article is to question the concept of raison d’état and its application. The article first analyzes the concept’s theoretical origins before exploring its applications and limitations. The analysis concludes with a case study of Germany’s position on the Israeli war on Gaza.

Definitions and Theoretical Debates on Reason of State

The notion of raison d’état is a complex political concept that authorizes rulers to adopt extraordinary measures to protect the integrity and security of the state, sometimes in defiance of normal moral or legal norms. The concept has its origins in the writings of the 15th-century Italian humanist thinker Niccolò Machiavelli.¹ In his work, The Prince, he argues that maintaining power and order may require immoral or deceptive actions. To him, the ends—the stability and security of the state—justify the means.

This theme is also explored by the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his political treatise “Leviathan.”² He argues that the absolute sovereignty of the monarch is crucial to avoid anarchy, and that the sovereign’s actions, whatever their nature, contribute to the peace and security of society. Similarly, the French political theorist of sovereignty Jean Bodin, defends a concentration of state power which, in certain situations, can transcend ordinary laws for the good of the state.³

In the modern era, the notion of raison d’état has been both revised and challenged. Carl Schmitt,⁴ a German jurist and political philosopher, posited that true sovereignty lies in the ability to decide the exceptional, asserting that the sovereign is the one who determines when ordinary laws can be suspended in the event of a major crisis. This perspective, however, has been criticized for its propensity to legitimize authoritarian regimes.

Max Weber,⁵ sociologist and economist, also looked into the concept, but from the perspective of the ethics of responsibility, distinguishing between decisions taken for the long-term good of the state and those motivated by immediate personal or political interests. Weber also warned of the dangers of impersonal bureaucracy, which, under the guise of raison d’état, can lead to abuses of power.

Hannah Arendt highlights the risks of systematic human rights violations that the application of raison d’état can entail. In her book The Origins of Totalitarianism,⁶ she explores how totalitarian regimes have used raison d’état as a means of justifying their actions and policies, often contradicting ethical and moral principles. Arendt examines the foundations and consequences of these practices in depth, emphasizing the dangers that they represent for individual freedom and social justice, and points to the risks of moral and political corruption inherent in the principle of raison d’état.

While raison d’état remains a subject of passionate debate for philosophers and political theorists, it also poses a problem in its implementation: how far can a state go to ensure its survival without compromising its founding principles and international norms?

Application and Limits of Raison d’Etat

Raison d’état has been put forward in history to justify actions that would otherwise be considered contrary to legal or moral norms. Take, for example, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when US President John F. Kennedy used this concept to legitimize a naval blockade of Cuba. This measure, potentially perceived as an act of war, was aimed at preventing a nuclear escalation. Later in American history, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US government defended its mass surveillance programs by invoking national security, a classic illustration of raison d’état.

In a European context, raison d’état is also evident in crisis management, as demonstrated by the French government’s response to terrorist attacks. By declaring a state of emergency, France extended police powers beyond the usual norms, thus affirming the pre-eminence of national security. But what is actually experienced as raison d’état, without having to be designated as such, is historically quite different for each state. Germany’s past may explain why Israel’s security has become an integral part of the German raison d’état. Yet it is rather unusual to make the survival of another state one’s own reason of state.⁷

While the application of raison d’état is often invoked for security purposes, it also poses major ethical dilemmas. Security measures, while effective, can encroach on individual rights and freedoms. For example, mass surveillance can lead to massive intrusions into private life, raising concerns about respect for the right to privacy.

In legal terms, invoking raison d’état can create tensions with international law, particularly in terms of human rights and the laws of war. International tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have frequently been confronted with cases in which a state’s actions, although presented as essential to national security, contradicted its international obligations. However, courts have generally held that raison d’état does not exonerate states from their human rights obligations, particularly when fundamental rights, such as the prohibition of torture, are at stake.

There also are numerous political and social implications of raison d’état. Used as a tool of government, it can serve to consolidate power within the state and to suppress opposition voices. This centralization of power can weaken democratic checks and balances, fostering the emergence of a more authoritarian regime. History is replete with examples of rulers invoking the principle to undermine democratic institutions and stifle dissent.

Although raison d’état may sometimes seem necessary to protect the nation against immediate threats, its effects can also lead to significant violations of democratic principles and human rights, as in the case of Germany’s stance toward Israel’s war on Gaza since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023.

Germany and the Israeli War on Gaza

Germany has a complex and multifaceted relationship with Israel, strongly influenced by the events of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Since 1949, Israel has benefited from financial support from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In 1951, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer introduced the idea of Wiedergutmachung—reparations for the murder of six million Jews by Hitler’s German Reich—which the FRG took over legally when it was founded in 1949. In particular, through the “Reparations Treaty” signed in 1952 between West Germany and Israel, Germany undertook to pay around 3 billion Deutschmarks (around 7 billion euros today) in direct reparations for Nazi crimes.

Since then, the relationship between Germany and Israel has been marked by the former’s strong commitment to the latter’s security, seen as a raison d’état. Germany’s unconditional allegiance to Israel takes many forms. In particular, it has been expressed through armaments cooperation since 1950, but also through Germany’s dedication to working for a stable, non-hostile environment for Israel in the Middle East. Finally, the existence of Israel as a raison d’état is also expressed in Germany’s position and role within major international organizations, where it seeks to serve the interests of its protégé.⁸

This historic commitment was renewed on March 18, 2008, when Chancellor Angela Merkel acknowledged Germany’s responsibility toward Israel before the Israeli Knesset, declaring: “Germany’s historic responsibility is part of my country’s raison d’état. This means that for me, as German Chancellor, Israel’s security is never negotiable.”⁹

After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Chancellor Olaf Scholz took up this “profession of faith,” modifying it slightly. In his government statement, he announced that: “At the moment, there is only one place for Germany. A place alongside Israel. This is what we mean when we say: Israel’s security is Germany’s raison d’état.”¹⁰

While these statements are in keeping with Germany’s tradition of Wiedergutmachung, Israel’s military operations in Gaza have put the Federal Republic in a delicate position, particularly regarding Israeli violations of human rights and international law. This situation even led to Nicaragua, on March 1, 2024, accusing Germany of complicity in genocide in Gaza, a charge that has so far been dismissed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Despite this pressure, German officials have continued to use raison d’état to justify their unconditional support for Israel. Foreign Minister Baerbock’s recent statement is unsurprisingly in line with her predecessors, showing just how much German policy is shackled by the weight of its past. The minister asserted Israel’s right to self-defense, even legitimizing strikes on Palestinian civilians. She declared: “If Hamas terrorists take refuge behind people, behind schools […], civilian places can also lose their protected status, because terrorists use them as shields.”¹¹

Her statement was roundly criticized at both the national and international levels. It came a year after the October 7 attack that claimed the lives of 1,200 Israelis, and after a year of war waged by Israel that has already claimed the lives of at least 42,000 and possibly as many as 186,000 Palestinians,¹² provoked a genocide in Gaza, and eliminated Hamas’s two leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar (mastermind of the October 7 attack). In view of the magnitude of these events (and without going into the details of Israeli’s opening of a new front in Lebanon), it is fair to question the minister’s intellectual honesty, when she repeatedly invokes the legitimate defense of Israel, while denying in passing the historical responsibility of this same state in the illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Critics argue that under the guise of raison d’état Germany could be overlooking human rights violations. In a 23-page report,¹³ the German parliament’s (Bundestag) scientific service has already expressed concerns about the use of the raison d’état argument. It states that “raison d’état is […] an a-legal category, a concept opposed to law” and that “in the tradition of liberal thought and natural law, the idea of raison d’état is opposed to the idea of law and the rule of law,” which Germany nevertheless wishes to embody and defend. A paradox, then?

In German civil society, the state’s muzzling of pro-Palestinian discourse by the argument of raison d’état is also beginning to weigh heavily on the minds of ordinary people. A recent study¹⁴ showed that 52 percent of the younger generation in Germany believe that their country should more clearly recognize the suffering of the Palestinian people affected by this war, compared with 11 percent who disagreed. Civic associations and intellectuals, including Jewish ones, have also written open letters¹⁵ to the German government, denouncing the police crackdown on all pro-Palestinian support and reminding it of the fundamental right to freedom of thought.

Germany is also suffering from international criticism. Former UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber points out that Israel has no right under Article 51 of the UN Charter¹⁶ to defend itself in the territories that it occupies. He also stressed that the crimes committed by Israel in Gaza are not justified by self-defense under international law.¹⁷ The UN Special Rapporteur on Palestine, Francesca Albanese, also denounced the German Foreign Minister’s speech, warning of the legal repercussions of supporting a state that commits international crimes. Her post on social network X.com stated, “Germany has decided to support a state that commits international crimes. This is a political choice, but it will also have legal implications.”¹⁸

In this context, raison d’état clearly reveals its limits and complications. While the concept enables Germany to maintain a coherent foreign policy with an ally, it exposes the country to accusations of partiality and of compromising democratic values and human rights, and to the risk of potential complicity in a genocide committed in Gaza.¹⁹

For Germany, this risk is particularly sensitive given its history and its solemn commitment never to forget the lessons of the Holocaust. Yet current German policy seems to indicate that the leitmotiv of Nie wieder (never again) is not understood as a universal, humanist motto, but as one reserved for a single community. Foreign Minister Baerbock, for example, exposed her moral defeat to the world by mourning the 1,200 victims of the October 7 attack, while ignoring the at least tens of thousands of victims²⁰ on the Palestinian side. This type of positioning or double-speak seems to be particularly dangerous. It carries within it the seeds of a new anti-Semitism that may be encouraged by the disproportionate war waged by Israel in the name of the Jews in response to the October 7 attacks.²¹

In the context of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, in which civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure have been widely reported and criticized,²² Germany is clearly faced with a complex moral and legal dilemma. Its support for Israel, justified by raison d’état in terms of security and diplomatic relations, can be seen as tacit approval of the strategies and means employed, including those which could be interpreted by the ICJ as genocidal.

This complicity, however indirect, highlights the challenges associated with raison d’état when it comes into conflict with international obligations and universal ethical principles. For Germany, this could not only affect its international reputation, but could also have legal repercussions, should the ICJ find that genocide has occurred in Gaza,²³ and should the International Criminal Court decide to prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in this conflict.

Thus, while analyzing the practical applications and limits of raison d’état, it is essential to recognize that decisions taken under this justification can sometimes entail profound consequences, including the possibility of complicity in acts considered unacceptable by the international community.

Conclusion

The raison d’état often invoked to justify controversial decisions under the guise of protecting national interests, can sometimes lead to actions that profoundly contradict ethical principles and international human rights standards. Germany’s support for Israel’s war on Gaza under the guise of Staatsräson is a striking example.

This dilemma underlines the need for in-depth reflection on the limits of the concept, especially in contexts where it is used to justify inhuman and immoral acts. The example of the war on Gaza also illustrates the risk of depoliticizing the conflict by invoking a raison d’état, which masks the real human and democratic issues behind justifications of national security and Israel’s right to self-defense. It therefore is important to question the meaning of raison d’état, since under the pretext of safeguarding sovereignty or diplomatic relations, it can trample universal rights and ignore international obligations. In such cases, raison d’état risks becoming folly.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.