Among Arab states, perhaps none faces a more complex challenge in managing relations with President Donald Trump than Qatar. Ironically, Doha’s deepening partnership with the Trump administration has been bolstered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ill-judged September 9, 2025, missile attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, where they had gathered to review a ceasefire deal proposed by the American president. The attack not only prompted legitimate questions among Gulf leaders about the reliability of the US security umbrella but also provoked the one emotional response that no ally of Trump can afford to trigger: his sense of personal betrayal. The assassination attempt backfired on Israel, provoking regional and global outrage and having the effect of drawing the United States even closer to Qatar and into the ceasefire effort, apparently the opposite of what Netanyahu had hoped to achieve.
On September 29, 2025, seeking to reassert his dominance and to humiliate Netanyahu, Trump forced him to call Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani from the Oval Office, where like a wayward child, Netanyahu duly apologized and promised never again to offend Trump’s good friends in Qatar. Three weeks later, the United States and Doha signed a major security pact, signaling an unprecedented personal and strategic alignment between Trump and Qatar.
This alliance comes with both opportunities and challenges for a Gulf state that has partly derived its influence from its ability to mediate regional conflicts. As a key mediator and as a newly-designated guarantor of the Gaza ceasefire, Qatar must now balance its partnership with Trump with its commitments on the ground.
Trump and Qatar: On the Evolving Wages of Trust
At the October 13, 2025, Sharm el-Sheikh summit that Trump convened to endorse the ceasefire and his peacemaking triumph, the president offered lavish praise for Qatar. “His Highness Sheikh Tamim,” Trump declared, “is respected by everybody…and in the most positive way….He’s got a tremendous heart and he’s a great leader, and his country loves him.” The US president’s praise for Qatar followed Doha’s pivotal role in the ceasefire talks, one blessed by Trump. The deal proceeded after secret talks involving lead envoy Steve Witkoff, his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya, and a senior Qatari official, at which the United States confirmed that Israel would not resume its assault if Hamas returned all remaining Gaza hostages. That Trump’s son-in-law sat down with a top Hamas leader attested to the US leader’s belief that Qatar’s leadership could deliver the Nobel Prize-winning diplomatic win that the US president craves.
Early in his first term, Trump was less of a vocal supporter of Doha. Initially he reflexively echoed the negative image of Qatar that some in Washington espoused, especially members of the pro-Israel lobby. His views shifted after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates imposed a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. At first enthusiastic about the Saudi and Emirati move, Trump reportedly became unhappy after his advisers informed him of the extent of diplomatic and security ties between Washington and Doha, which hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East.
Trump’s warming first-term relations with Qatar likely were also influenced by other factors: Qatar’s lobbying in Washington, the expansion of US-Qatari business and financial interests, and Doha’s key role in mediating talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which paved the way for the Afghanistan withdrawal that Trump wanted. Trump’s meetings with the Qatari Emir and other royals in 2018 and 2019 cemented the personal, political, and economic ties between Trump and Doha.
US-Qatari Relations Today: Three Intersecting Challenges
Now in his second term, Trump and Qatar have forged an even closer relationship. A key factor may be the connections between Trump, his close family members, top aides, and Qatar. For instance, on May 2025, the Trump administration accepted a Qatari gift of a luxury Boeing 747 to serve as Trump’s Air Force One and reportedly to go to the Trump Presidential Library after he leaves office. But it was the Gaza crisis that infused the Trump-Qatar relationship with a new personal and strategic dimension. Today, the future of US-Qatar relations will hinge, at least in part, on what happens in Gaza. On this score, Qatar’s leaders face three challenges.
Groundhog Day in Gaza
The first challenge comes from the vague nature of Trump’s 20-point Gaza “peace plan.” As many experts have noted, there is no plan at all- if by plan we mean a coherent set of steps that will move Israel and the Palestinians from a state of war to the ambitious goal envisioned: a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. The first phase has been partially achieved: all the living Israeli hostages have been freed, some of the dead hostages’ bodies have been released to Israel, and some 2,000 Palestinians have been released by Israel. To his credit, Trump’s intervention also forced Netanyahu to retreat, at least temporarily, from the bloody and hopeless mission to eradicate Hamas. But the plan does not spell out a mechanism for disarming Hamas, establishing a stable demarcation (the “yellow line”) of the Gaza territory under direct Israeli control, building a credible international security force, or creating a technocratic governing body that includes Palestinians but excludes Hamas. Indeed, as the Washington Post noted, rather than risk defining a viable “day after,” the plan has led to a “Groundhog Day,” with Hamas holding on to its remaining weapons and some 60 percent of its tunnels, while Israel resumes military strikes targeting both tunnels and the surviving Hamas leaders.
Doha must depend on the Trump administration to keep things from collapsing.
This situation has put Qatar in a difficult position. As one of the three regional “guarantors” of the Gaza deal, along with Egypt and Turkey, Doha is supposed to hold the parties accountable, to monitor compliance, to resolve disputes, and even to enforce the agreement. But how Qatar is supposed to muster the means and authority to achieve these ambitious goals, independently or with assistance from regional partners or the United States, is unclear. Qatar is committed to realizing what its premier and foreign minister insist must be the ultimate prize—a Palestinian state. But that goal is tied to a chaotic process that inevitably will be contingent upon the actions of spoilers from Hamas or the Israeli government—and has not been agreed by either the United States or Israel. Doha therefore must depend on the Trump administration—and on Trump himself—to keep things from collapsing.
Trump’s obsessive quest for a Nobel Prize may lead him to find other wars to “end,” leaving others to figure out the vexing details of the Gaza/Israel/Palestine mess. Doha must now find a way to engage Trump without drawing attention to the superficial nature of his “peace” plan that could soon descend into large-scale fighting and resume the massive loss of civilian lives in Gaza.
Trump and the White House as “Bibi-sitter”
A second challenge for Qatar is how to communicate with a quixotic US president. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law and unofficial adviser Jared Kushner have become central to Doha’s engagement with Washington. What they bring to the table includes extensive financial ties to Qatar and a deep personal trust that Trump and Qatar’s leadership have placed in them. For Qatar, Witkoff and Kushner—not Vice President JD Vance or Secretary of State Marco Rubio—are the key intermediaries capable of turning Trump’s impulses into policy. Yet one of the paradoxes of Trump’s leadership style is that, in the absence of his sustained personal involvement, even his closest confidants may not have the necessary clout to make an impact.
A third challenge confronts Qatar. Since Richard Nixon’s dealings with Israel following the 1973 October War, rarely has any US administration been so closely involved in managing Israeli leaders. Despite Vice President Vance’s insistence that in trying to carefully manage Israel’s actions during the ceasefire the White House is not treating Israel like a “toddler” or a US “protectorate,” the Israeli media has described the Trump administration as “Bibi-sitting” the prime minister. Indeed, Netanyahu’s coerced apology to Qatar may have been humiliating, but Trump’s intervention may have saved the prime minister’s political career, offering an exit strategy that secured the remaining Israeli hostages, potentially brought the endless Gaza war to an end, and prompted the US president to suggest that Israel’s President Isaac Herzog pardon the prime minister for his alleged transgressions. The indebtedness is clear: Netanyahu owes Trump his political survival.
Yet their relationship is not so straightforward. Having seized the political lifeline that Trump threw him, Netanyahu is now using it to draw a new “yellow” demarcation line that could give Israel permanent military control over Gaza—an outcome that would sabotage Trump’s plan. Although Trump flatly insists “I will decide what I think is right” for Israel, he has not yet imposed a red line on Netanyahu’s maneuvering. This contradiction reveals the weakness of a foreign policy that is only as coherent as the man behind it. Should Qatar turn to Trump to rein in Netanyahu, it might discover that the US President has nothing to gain from doing so. Trump cannot be a dependable fireman if he is also an arsonist.
The Useful Ambiguities and Risks of Trump’s Qatar Defense Pact
Trump’s September 29, 2025, executive order, “Ensuring the Security of the State of Qatar,” committed the United States to “regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” No other state in the Middle East, including Israel, has ever received such an explicit commitment. Yet this executive order conforms to the logic of a diplomacy that is built around personal relationships. Trump’s commitment to Qatar may seem vast, but it is a product of his personal will, not anchored in a treaty commitment ratified by Congress. Nor is the new security guarantee a mutual defense agreement that requires parallel obligations from Qatar, or even a “giveaway” to Qatar as some claim. Trump and the Qataris know that Israel or Iran would be highly unlikely to attack Doha again. The executive order thus may largely serve a symbolic function.
Trump’s commitment to Qatar is a product of his personal will.
The pragmatic nature of this relationship may serve both parties. As Qatar’s leaders wrestle with the role that they will play in Gaza and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they will have to make decisions that could test their relations with Trump. The risk will be heightened if Qatar’s leaders want to play a bigger role in the region beyond that of mere mediator. The path forward for Doha will be tricky.
Three Options for Qatar
There are at least three possible paths that Qatar might take in Gaza. One is to work largely behind the scenes with the United States, Egypt, and Turkey to secure diplomatic progress on the many unresolved steps of the Trump deal. Taking on the role of “mediator plus” would require Doha to keep out of the limelight yet use its vast financial resources to support the other guarantors to keep Hamas and Israel from breaking the truce. Qatar could also help financially with other challenges, such as creating an international security force or building a new governance architecture for Gaza.
A second option for Qatar is to tackle these goals in a more energetic and public manner that would underscore—and draw authority from—Qatar’s upgraded alliance with Trump and his administration. Both these approaches, especially the second, would hinge on support from Trump himself, which is at best an uncertain proposition. Moreover, the more ambitious Qatar gets in this respect, the more attention it will attract from governments such as the United Arab Emirates and Israel that suspect its motives and power. These and other players may work hard to contain a proactive Qatar despite its partnership with Trump.
The third option for Qatar is to make a major strategic shift by undertaking a substantial financial investment in the construction of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. This would make the Emirate a regional player on par with Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Such a game-changing role would not contradict Doha’s previous positions, including its advocacy for a two-state solution and its embrace of the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. But a dramatic move of this magnitude could cause political and strategic tremors across the Middle East. It would require Trump to compel Israel to accept a path to a Palestinian political future that Israel’s elected leaders have done their best to prevent. Qatar’s foreign policy is no doubt harder to sustain in light of its new role as guarantor of the Gaza Plan: Doha is now tied to the United States in ways that its own leaders could scarcely have imagined a few years or even months ago. But in a Middle East where bold gambits rarely yield dividends and often backfire, caution may well be the safest bet.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: The White House
