As the Middle East edges closer to a broader war, both regional tensions and domestic politics have put the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan increasingly on edge. While Jordan is not directly involved in the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts, it is deeply affected by them. The kingdom’s recent elections offer insights into the current state of Jordanian politics, marked by widespread public discontent and opposition gains against the backdrop of rising Middle East violence.
New Electoral System, New Elections
On September 10, Jordan held elections for its 138-member lower house of parliament. (The king selects the 65 members of the upper house, or Senate.) The previous vote, which took place in 2020 during the global COVID pandemic and the resultant health restrictions, witnessed a paltry turnout of 29.9 percent of eligible voters, according to official figures. That weak participation was not just due to COVID-era restrictions, but also to voters’ low confidence in the election process, in their choice of candidates, and in the effectiveness of parliament in a monarchy dominated by the king.
The government intended for this year’s elections to address such complaints, as part of a broader campaign of reform and political ‘modernization.’ In 2021, a royally appointed national committee for reform (the latest in a long succession of such committees) proposed new electoral rules to strengthen the political party system. The changes, which the government approved in 2022, allow for a gradual increase in parliamentary seats reserved for political parties. As Jordan has lacked a strong party system since the late 1950’s, the 2022 reforms offer the potential for significant change.
The new electoral rules allow for a gradual increase in parliamentary seats reserved for political parties.
In 1957, at the height of the Arab Cold War, and after leftist and pan-Arab nationalist parties made significant gains in elections held the previous year, the king declared martial law and outlawed political parties. It was not until 1991 that a new National Charter re-established a formal multi-party system and competitive elections. In the ensuing decades, parliament has remained mostly feeble, but the weakness of parties has been even more glaring. For decades, many activists and other politicians avoided joining parties for fear of getting on the radar of Jordan’s intelligence services. The new system is supposed to reverse decades of anti-party efforts by the Jordanian state. But Jordanian citizens are understandably cautious and skeptical that the changes will matter.
The new electoral law introduces a mixed system with voters casting ballots for 97 seats chosen from 18 local electoral districts and for 41 seats chosen from one national district. Thirty percent of the total seats are reserved for political parties, an increase over the previous system. The new system also continues quotas to guarantee representation for Christians (nine seats), Circassians and Chechens (three seats), and women (18 seats). In each future election, the percentage of seats allotted to parties will increase gradually, supposedly leading to a more robust political party system, and eventually to party-led governments chosen by parliament. (Currently the king appoints the prime minister and the cabinet, which is approved by the parliament.)
Electoral Results and Islamist Gains
Even though Jordan is not a party to the war in Gaza, the September polls were effectively wartime elections. Every Jordanian citizen, regardless of background, has felt deeply connected to the devastation of Gaza, monitoring on a daily and even hourly basis the destruction and death toll of the war. Just as important, Jordanians of all walks of life, from the palace to street protesters, have watched with alarm and anguish as Israeli settlers—as well as Israeli soldiers and police—carried out acts of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. Such violence against Palestinians, who make up the majority of Jordanians, has cast a shadow over Jordan itself.
While candidates and parties campaigned on public discontent over the struggling economy and staggeringly high unemployment rates (21.4 percent overall, but more than 40 percent among youth), they also demanded more action to protect Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Debates over the Gaza war were at the very heart of electoral campaigns, and loomed as a wildcard over the September vote. Would the war and related West Bank violence influence the outcome? The answer now appears to be a firm yes, especially in terms of aiding the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Muslim Brotherhood-linked opposition party, which focused its campaign on Gaza and the economy.
The IAF achieved a very strong showing, tripling its representation to 31 seats, its largest since 1989. Voter turnout did increase slightly, to an official 32.25 percent, but that was nowhere near the boost for which election authorities hoped. In addition to the impressive showing for Islamists, some newer parties fared well, including al-Mithaq (21 seats) and Eradah (19 seats), while the more liberal Taqaddam party secured eight seats. Twenty-seven women won seats, beyond the quota of 18 set in the rules.
While the Mithaq and Eradah parties are relatively new, their candidates and leaderships were familiar, including several former government officials and cabinet ministers. They collectively seemed to represent an establishment-oriented bloc that, despite IAF gains, outnumbers Islamists in the new parliament. Indeed, that may be exactly the outcome that the state preferred. Islamists declared victory, and intend to play an active role in politics “under the dome” of the Jordanian parliament. But the regime may view them as held in check by more establishment members of parliament including tribal elites and veteran former officials. Immediately after the elections, King Abdullah II accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Bishr Khasawneh (who had served since October 2020) and appointed a new prime minister: his former chief of staff, Jafar Hassan.
Confrontations in the Street and Within Governing Institutions
If these were wartime elections, what can be expected from a new parliament sworn in under such conditions? For one thing, even if parliament remains weak, and even if Islamists and other opposition figures appear outnumbered by pro-establishment MPs, more vocal opposition is expected to materialize, moving from the streets to the floor of parliament. That does not mean that Jordan’s extensive grassroots protest movement will be less active. Rather, some more confrontational messages will appear both in the streets and state institutions.
Jordan’s Islamists have been a large part of the recent protest movements and street demonstrations.
Jordan’s Islamists have been a large part of the recent protest movements and street demonstrations, but they remain one force among many in an ideologically and socially diverse set of groups. Throughout the Gaza war, Jordanian protesters have organized, marched, demonstrated, and demanded changes in state policy. They have called for Jordan to abrogate its 1994 peace treaty with Israel and its controversial gas deal with Israel and to radically change its extensive defense and security relations with the United States, including by removing US troops from Jordanian soil. Such demands will now also come from the small but significant opposition bloc in parliament. The regime may view these calls as non-starters, but appeared concerned with street protests that chanted pro-Hamas slogans, viewing them as crossing one of many red lines for protests in the kingdom.
Such demands and slogans have led to the arrest of hundreds of protesters. But similar demands are now likely to come from Jordan’s minority of opposition MPs. While it may be easy for some in the state to dismiss such policy stances, they may also have broad popular support, as indicated by widespread informal boycotts of American goods across the kingdom. It is impossible to know exact numbers, but political activists have claimed, including to this author, that more citizens have participated in the boycotts than voted in the September elections.
Regional Conflicts and Domestic Consequences
The Hashemite regime is concerned with the increasingly vocal pro-Hamas sentiments and statements from the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front, and is trying to contain the activities of domestic Islamists and Hamas in the kingdom. Jordan’s relations with Hamas have long been cold, especially since expelling key leaders in the organization in 1999. The Hashemite state has strongly supported the Palestinian Authority and preferred to sideline Hamas. But the October 7 attack on Israel and resulting war in Gaza have forced the Islamist movement to the forefront of Jordanian political discourse once again.
To say that the Jordanian public is frustrated with the situation in Gaza would be a severe understatement. Furious might be a more fitting word, combined with despair over the daily carnage and over the inability to stop it. This anger was reflected in the recent shooting at the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge, at the border crossing between Jordan and the occupied West Bank, in which a Jordanian truck driver opened fire and killed three Israelis. While Israelis viewed this as a terrorist attack, many Jordanians viewed the assailant as a martyr, seeing his actions as a heroic and desperate act of resistance. On social media, many praised the driver for taking action against Israel, and condemned the Jordanian state—along with all Arab states—for failing to do so, regardless of their verbal protests, condemnations, and calls for a ceasefire. Outside observers may find that response chilling, yet is but a small hint of the deep reservoir of frustration, anguish, and fury in Jordan over what many see as a modern-day Nakba unfolding before their eyes.
For the state, the issue is not confined to concerns with Jordanian Islamists and a militant movement in the form of Hamas. It is also their connection to a more powerful regional actor, Iran. As always, Jordanian domestic politics is never purely domestic, and even Israeli-Iranian tensions affect the kingdom and its domestic politics. This was made especially clear in January 2024, when an Iraqi Shia militia, backed by Iran, attacked Tower 22, a US military outpost on the Jordanian border, killing three American soldiers. In April, Iran sent a massive barrage of missiles and drones against Israel, many of which Jordanian, Israeli, and US forces shot down as the weapons were crossing over Jordan. Jordanian officials saw this as a necessary act of self-defense. But the public reaction was intense, as many Jordanians forcefully condemned their own government for allegedly aiding Israel even as the Gaza war continued to decimate Palestinians.
Jordanian security concerns, already focused on the Israel-Hamas war, increased amidst rising tensions between Israel and Hezbollah and Iran. The government is worried about the actions of Iran and its proxies in the region, but is just as worried, if not more so, with the actions of Israel—in Gaza, in the West Bank, and now in Lebanon. Jordan has long feared becoming trapped between Israel and Iran in a wider regional war.
At present, many Jordanian officials and members of society see the Netanyahu government as doing everything in its power to destroy Gaza while uprooting much of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and attempting to provoke a wider regional war. Of course, both state and society in Jordan are vigorously opposed to all these things. But Jordan also stands to be directly affected by them, especially if longstanding fears of a mass Israeli expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan become real.
In the meantime, ordinary Jordanians are doing what they can—participating in boycotts and sometimes in protests, and some of them voting. Some are likely to join protesters and new MPs in demanding major policy changes, especially in relations with Israel and the United States. More will be trying to manage their daily lives amidst regional tensions and difficult economic conditions. And all will be viewing with profound concerns the relentlessly negative news from Gaza and the West Bank, even as fears mount of a wider war with devastating consequences for Jordan and the entire region.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Jordanian Independent Election Commission
