The monumental events that took place in the Middle East in 2024 augur radical changes in the region’s geopolitical environment. Israel’s ongoing genocidal war on Gaza, its continued operations in southern Lebanon despite a negotiated ceasefire, and its illegal territorial expansion at the expense of Syria have helped erode international law as a guarantor of state sovereignty, peace, and security. Regime change in Syria from authoritarian rule to a yet-unspecified Islamist political setup promises a potential vacuum in a pivotal state in the eastern Mediterranean. Sustained attacks and counterattacks by Yemen’s Houthis on the one hand, and Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom on the other, threaten Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula peace. The shrinking of Iran’s regional influence after the weakening of factions in its Axis of Resistance like Hamas and Hezbollah has limited its ability to be a counterweight to Israel’s hegemonic designs, perhaps for years to come.
Meanwhile, the international community’s defense of and complicity in Israel’s wars has clarified the contours of a gaping hole in the former’s commitment to international law and norms. The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other countries have gone out of their way to support Israel’s actions despite their pronounced platitudes about democracy, human rights, and respect for international humanitarian law. Indeed, they have made sure that Israel has the most advanced weapons systems to continue its assaults without regard to the human toll those have caused for millions of civilians in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Given their track record thus far, it is unlikely that they will change their support for the Zionist state any time soon.
Arab Center Washington DC asked its fellows and affiliates to provide their opinions about what they expect to be pressing issues in the Middle East in 2025. Their comments are below.
Any Recalibration of Iran’s Policy in the Middle East?
Dan Brumberg, Professor of Government, Georgetown University
It is hardly surprising that in a recent interview, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that “we are still ready to enter constructive dialogue without any delay about our nuclear program, a dialogue with the aim of reaching an agreement.” For Iran, the fall—and unseemly nighttime flight—of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad represented a mortal strategic blow from which it cannot soon recover. The reasons are simple. Iran’s Axis of Resistance depended on a “no war, no peace” strategy to deter an Israeli or Israeli/American attack on its nuclear facilities. Israel’s ferocious fall 2024 bombing and missile campaign against Hezbollah drove a nail into this strategy and helped set the stage for Assad’s fall in part because Hezbollah was not able to save him. Caught by surprise, Russia and Iran neither had the means nor the will to intervene. As a result, the strategic landscape has been transformed.
Hezbollah can no longer threaten Israel with a catastrophic attack and thus deter an Israeli assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Moreover, Israel’s October 26 air assault on Iran wiped out most of Tehran’s key ballistic missile defenses. With its resistance strategy in tatters, Tehran now has two very different choices: to pursue a revised version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or to accelerate its enrichment program to create a nuclear weapons capacity for a first and second strike against Israel. Because this second option would require at least a year, it would likely invite a US and Israeli attack before then. Iran’s far better option is diplomacy, both on the nuclear issue and on the broader question of its regional relations, especially with Syria and with Turkey, the country that made Assad’s fall happen.
Iran’s hardliners fear that any diplomatic effort will strengthen the reformists and President Masoud Pezeshkian. And if Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei should suddenly die or become ill, the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps might conclude that the very revolution they are constitutionally pledged to defend is endangered. The transformation of Iran’s domestic and regional landscape could represent a real opportunity for the United States. But it is hard to imagine President-elect Donald Trump—who repudiated the JCPOA in 2018—has the temperament and imagination to fashion an effective US response. His preference for bombast and threats will probably be echoed by the men and women he has chosen for leading national security and foreign policy positions. Indeed, his advisors might conclude that what happened in Syria will now unfold in Iran and that the United States should rely now more than ever on “maximum pressure” to force Iran to accept terms for a nuclear deal that it has always rejected, or wait for the regime to disintegrate. Because neither outcome is likely, however, the United States needs to forge a credible diplomatic strategy. Yet it is far from clear that anyone in the new administration would dare make a case for the kind of diplomatic engagement that is anathema to Trump.
Potential Change from Authoritarianism in the Middle East, If Any
Dana El Kurd, Non-resident Senior Fellow; Assistant Professor, University of Richmond
As a new year begins, it is heartening to see Syria emerge from the fall of the Assad regime, a critical blow to authoritarian power in the Middle East. This was a particularly poignant moment for activists involved in the Syrian Revolution and for all those who found hope in the broader Arab Spring, as exiles returned to Damascus to celebrate Assad’s downfall, mourn their dead, and demand accountability. The dramatic shift in Syria came as a shock to other regimes, especially the Arab states that had normalized relations with the Syrian dictatorship.
Yet while the fall of the Assad regime is welcome, the attempted authoritarian consolidation underway in the region continues. Iran’s Axis of Resistance, one of the main authoritarian alliances in the region, has suffered many blows from the US-backed Israeli wars on Lebanon and Syria. Moreover, in a surprise move, Israel expanded its occupation of Syrian territory and demilitarized the Syrian state within the first days of the new regime.
Crucially, the genocide in Gaza continues to unfold, and the consequences of such state violence for the peoples of the region remain unaddressed. Instead, both the outgoing and incoming American administrations continue to tout Arab-Israeli normalization as some sort of peace, with the Palestinians sidelined once again in whatever comes after the bombing ends. The lessons learned by authoritarians—both state and non-state actors—is that violence on the side of the West will be tolerated. Thus, Israel’s integration in the authoritarian regional order will likely continue, and regimes will continue to strengthen their capacities for surveillance, repression, and mass violence.
As Donald Trump returns to office, autocrats across the region will exploit opportunities for corruption of the US government to advance their goals and crackdowns. In Trump’s first presidency, journalists were killed in embassies and blockades were imposed against US-allied states. One can expect Trump-friendly authoritarians to act with even greater impunity this time around.
All in all, unless violence, regardless of source, is addressed with explicit consequences by the international community, authoritarianism will continue to wreak havoc on the region in the coming year. At the same time, as the Syrians have demonstrated, the ingenuity and resilience of the people in their fight against authoritarianism will also continue.
What to Possibly Expect in Syria?
Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis
The December collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has contributed a serious complication to what to expect in the Middle East in 2025. Making this judgment more salient is the reality that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist organization with roots in al-Qaeda, was the main actor, and victor, in the vanquishing of Syria’s Baathism that thrived on a contrived ethos of secularism, socialism, and Arab nationalism. In 2025, HTS must overcome several hurdles in order to solidify its rule and ensure peace and stability in Syria and then to organize a development drive that can address the economic collapse bequeathed by the Assad regime.
Politically, HTS will have to convince Syrians that it is a good governing alternative to more than half a century of brutal Baathist and Assad authoritarianism. First and foremost, HTS should work on rebuilding the Syrian state and its institutions to make them inclusive of all sectors of Syrian society. No ethnic, religious, or social group should be excluded from participating in building the new state. Thus far, the new regime has not conducted a wholesale program of arrests and detention of all those responsible for atrocities against the Syrian people. The best venue for such an important task is a truth and reconciliation commission that would investigate and punish those responsible for past violations. But Syria must not repeat the Iraqi mistake of full de-Baathification that considered all former Baathists guilty of atrocities and deprived them of participating in rebuilding the country after long years of authoritarian rule.
Economically, HTS must provide a vision for steering away from centralized policies that, although allowing for some free enterprise, made the Syrian state the central actor. That economic model has engendered nepotism and corruption and allowed the development of crony capitalism that fed on its closeness to the center of power and connections to international trade mechanisms. HTS would do well to encourage domestic economic development with a vibrant agricultural sector and a nascent industrial sector. It also would do well to invite Arab investors who can both help its economic development and facilitate good relations with the wider Arab world.
2025: A Year of Internal Upheaval and Retrospection in Israel
Khalil E. Jahshan, Executive Director
Listening to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu and his supporters at home and abroad, one gets the impression that Israel has achieved a momentous victory in its war in Gaza and is transitioning to a new phase of healing and recovery in 2025. In reality, the opposite is true. Israeli society has been as deeply affected by the events of the past 15 months as much as Palestinian society has, particularly when considering the military, political, economic, psychological, and social dimension of the futile war of vengeance that has decimated the Gaza Strip since October 7, 2023.
While admitting that the Israeli government has failed thus far to win the release of all hostages held by various Palestinian groups in the Strip, many Israeli political analysts would have you believe that the governing Netanyahu coalition has recovered its balance and achieved most of its initial objectives in Gaza and Lebanon by degrading the military and governing capabilities of its main local opponents Hamas and Hezbollah. They add that undermining Iran’s defense capabilities and diminishing its regional footprint contributed to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and gave Israel an unexpected opportunity to reshape the region according to its own fanciful vision. These musings are clearly a cause of celebration for most Israelis.
However, what these pundits fail to acknowledge is the fact that October 7 acquired a larger-than-life significance by surpassing the limited impacts brought to bear in the past by conflicts since the 1967 war, which allowed Israel the luxury of keeping the fighting outside of its borders and consequently facilitating quick recovery. The war in 2024 represents a different ballgame that might indeed allow Israel the option of regaining its mojo, but at a greater price and slower pace this time around.
The new year might not fulfill the wishes of most Israelis when they greet each other with the traditional Hebrew expression, “Shanah Tova U’metukah” (Wishing You a Happy and Sweet Year). Recovering from the October 7, 2023, shock and the psychological and economic burden of a genocidal war that solved none of the political components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is apt to turn 2025, indeed the rest of the decade, into a complicated and turbulent recovery process. This process threatens Israeli society with unforeseen internal upheaval in the pursuit of accountability and full retrospect of what just transpired. But more important, the recovery is likely to be about the kind of state that Israel aspires to be in its post-2024 phase.
Can Lebanon See Different Fortunes in 2025?
Patricia Karam, Non-resident Fellow
The demise of Hezbollah and the election of Army Commander Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s new president after more than two years of a presidential vacuum provide a brief opportunity to recover a viable national formula for governance, one based on unity and commonwealth instead of defeat and grievances. In this next phase, the key will be the full implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701, on which the recently signed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah is based, disbanding militias, and ensuring exclusive state control of weapons through the Lebanese Armed Forces under the aegis of the new president. If Hezbollah is willing to cooperate and Aoun convinces it to change from an Iran-backed paramilitary group into a regular political party, the president will be able to centralize weapons in the hands of the state.
In doing so, it will be important for Aoun to avoid humiliating battles with Hezbollah and for the post-Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah organization to emerge neither as a winner securing support nor as a loser accumulating grievance. Moreover, Lebanon’s Shia, whom Hezbollah purportedly represents and who are reeling from massive destruction brought about by the latest Israeli onslaught, must not be made to feel marginalized. That said, the unraveling of the logic of Hezbollah’s parallel state-like structure needs to be accompanied by the realization that there can be no return to the status quo ante.
Lebanon is at a juncture with the long-desired opportunity for new leadership—an independent and reform-minded cabinet led by Nawaf Salam composed of a fresh generation of leaders—to break the cycle of mismanagement and corruption. Critical political and economic reforms also need to be undertaken to reverse the country’s severe governance and economic deficits, which do not even include the current humanitarian crisis caused by the most recent conflict with Israel. A credible reform effort will help restore both domestic and international confidence in state institutions and position them to embark on the momentous task of rebuilding the country.
A New, if Shaky, Balance of Power in the Middle East
Nabeel A. Khoury, ACW Non-resident Fellow
Fortified internally by a majority right-wing government and supportive public opinion and externally by unprecedented support from the United States and the United Kingdom, on October 8, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched retaliatory strikes against the Axis of Resistance forces in Gaza and Lebanon, eventually decimating Hamas and Hezbollah leadership cadres. The weakening of the Assad regime’s regional support helped bring about its demise in December. Yemen has also suffered retaliatory attacks by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel, affecting civilian infrastructure in Hodeida, Sanaa, and most recently in Saada, home to the Houthi leadership of the Ansar Allah militia.
The violence of the past 14 months has shifted the balance of power in the region in favor of Israel, at least for the time being. As internal power struggles unfold in the affected countries, it will be more difficult to build peace and stability. Hamas has been severely weakened as a result of constant bombardment and destruction of tunnels, but the organization survives and continues to resist Israeli forces inside Gaza, while its supporters in the occupied West Bank attack soldiers and settlements. Hezbollah in Lebanon has accepted a ceasefire with Israel that delinks its war with the Zionist state from the violence in Gaza, a military withdrawal from south Lebanon, and a handover of positions along the border to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Though weakened and now deprived of its logistics pipeline from Iran through Syria, Hezbollah remains a potent military force and a necessary part of internal politics.
The potential expansion of the Abraham Accords under the incoming Trump administration will add to the complexity of regional politics. New internal and regional strategies will have to be devised by the states of the region, all with uncertain outcomes. The reshaping of the Middle East is underway, but the outcome is far from predictable.
What to Expect in Palestinian Politics in 2025?
Yousef Munayyer, Head of Palestine/Israel Program and Senior Fellow
It is hard to imagine a Palestinian politics during a genocide—and it seems almost impossible to do so as countless Palestinians continue to be slaughtered by the Israeli war machine in Gaza. Looking forward into 2025, the biggest questions around Palestinian politics will come to the fore when and if the genocide in Gaza stops. At the moment, there is renewed hope that a ceasefire deal in Gaza is close, but this road has been travelled too often before without success to be genuinely optimistic this time.
Should the post-genocide moment actually arrive in 2025, Palestinian politics will need to reckon with how to respond to the catastrophic loss of life and the historic trauma that rivals only the Nakba in Palestinian history. How can Palestinians, in a moment of utmost vulnerability, recreate effective or even visible leadership? How can Palestinian representative institutions be rebuilt? Perhaps most important, what strategic lessons can be learned from the failures of past decades that set the stage for the current profound Palestinian political weakness at this most desperate hour of need?
Considering current trends, there is no guarantee that the post-genocide moment will arrive in 2025. Israel has been able to get away with unprecedented mass murder. It has been able to destroy and conquer territory into which it has long sought to expand. Today, perhaps more than ever before, Israel sees itself as on the cusp of finally being able to shape the land as it has long desired it to be, free of Palestinian Arabs. The planets, too, seem to be aligning to enable this bloody conquest as a far-right Israeli government will soon have a Trump administration as counterpart. The grimmest of questions to be answered in 2025 is not how Palestinian politics will rebound after a genocide but whether they will have a chance to at all.
General Expectations for US Policy in the Middle East
Annelle Sheline, Non-resident Fellow
Donald Trump’s personnel selections for his incoming administration signal his intent to maintain Biden’s overwhelming support for Israel and antagonism toward Iran. His national security picks include Pete Hegseth for Secretary of Defense, Mike Waltz for National Security Advisor, John Ratcliffe for CIA Director, Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, Elise Stefanik for Ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Huckabee for Ambassador to Israel, and Steve Witkoff for Middle East envoy.
Yet Trump may be less willing than Biden to bow to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Trump team likely wants to facilitate Saudi normalization with Israel—a goal that Biden’s lieutenants repeatedly failed to achieve—and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may have Trump’s ear when he insists that Saudi Arabia will only normalize if Israel offers a theoretical horizon for a Palestinian state. Given the hardline nature of Netanyahu’s coalition, he is unlikely to concede even a superficial acknowledgement of Palestinian self-determination—a stance that may frustrate Trump’s desire to demonstrate his deal-making prowess.
Trump II is likely to continue many of the regional policies of the Biden administration, which themselves largely reflected continuity from Trump I. Biden’s foreign policy returned to traditional rhetoric about human rights, democracy, and reasserting American leadership on the global stage, but especially after October 7, 2023, it became clear that such concepts only guided American foreign policy when used as a cudgel against US adversaries. Trump will eschew such rhetorical window dressing and pursue a foreign policy baldly guided by what he sees as putting America first. With the hawkish team he has assembled, though, he may find it difficult to keep the United States out of yet another unpopular war in the Middle East.
The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Borya Galperin
