On September 7, Algerians headed to the polls for an early presidential election that revealed deep apathy and a potential risk to stability in Africa’s territorially largest nation. Algeria’s politico-military ruling elite, known as ‘Le Pouvoir,’ apparently hoped that the election would be successful in mobilizing large crowds for incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and securing five more years of stability. Instead, the vote was widely viewed as a sham and was marred by controversy, abysmal turnout, and muffled political anger.
Election Results
Official results announced on September 8 declared the 78-year-old Tebboune as the winner, having secured a Soviet-style 94.65 percent of the vote, which allowed him to avoid a runoff. The electoral commission stated that the only two other candidates—Abdelali Hassani, president of the moderate Islamist party Movement of Society for Peace, and Youcef Aouchiche of the left-leaning Socialist Forces Front—had won 3 percent and 2 percent of the vote, respectively.
Allegations of electoral irregularities quickly emerged. Hassani filed a complaint about the result to the Constitutional Court on September 10. Shortly thereafter, all three candidates, including Tebboune himself, issued a joint statement claiming irregularities, a lack of clarity in final results, and conflicting voter turnout figures. In response, the electoral court certified the landslide election on September 14 with minor alterations to the official results, stating that Tebboune won with 84 percent of the vote, instead of the original 94, and claiming that Hassani and Aouchiche in fact won 9.6 and 6.1 percent, respectively.
Yet the court’s certification could not diminish the allegations of electoral fraud, as speculation of foul play had begun even before the polls opened. In March, Tebboune rescheduled the election to September from its original December 2024 date. The decision was instantly met with skepticism and outrage on social media, with allegations that the move was designed to shorten opposition candidates’ campaigning time and increase turnout at the end of summer vacation. The decision helped disqualify more than a dozen candidates who had signaled or officially declared their intention to run. They included prominent opposition leader Zubaida Assoul, a lawyer and activist known for advocating for political prisoners and democratic reform. Assoul was deeply involved in the Hirak movement, whose mass protests beginning in early 2019 triggered the resignation of long-serving President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Moving up the elections left Tebboune with only Aouchiche and Hassani as competitors, both of whom have limited prowess in the Algerian street, thus paving the way to his easy victory. For months before the vote, a sense of malaise pervaded the Algerian public, which was still grappling with the regime’s crushing of Hirak.
Tebboune’s 2024 candidacy was not supported by a wide base of Algerians, as indicated by the official national turnout figure of less than 24 percent.
While Tebboune, and his supporters, are satisfied with his landslide, one factor should be of significant concern to Le Pouvoir. As was the case with Tebboune’s first term election in 2019, his 2024 candidacy was not supported by a wide base of Algerians, as indicated by the official national turnout figure of less than 24 percent. Some regions, such as the region of Kabylia, home to the nation’s largest concentration of Amazigh peoples and a longtime bastion of dissent, reportedly recorded a turnout of less than 1 percent. This historically low national figure was something the regime wanted to avoid, or at least avoid reaching the public, and they claimed official participation rate was 48 percent. Indeed, this dubious figure was one of the main reasons behind the joint statement questioning the electoral authority’s results. Clearly, the lack of participation of millions of Algerians, amidst calls in July by well-known politicians, academics, and lawyers to boycott the elections, presents Tebboune and his backers with a serious problem with popular legitimacy. Their weak legitimacy has plagued the political system since Tebboune was first elected in the December 2019 elections, which the Hirak movement boycotted.
Ever-Present Le Pouvoir
The masterminds behind Tebboune’s presidency and the regime more broadly are known as Le Pouvoir, which refers to an opaque group of military, security, and political elites who have controlled state institutions and maintained the status quo since independence from France in 1962. While conventional wisdom may suggest that Algeria is merely another Arab military regime, its true nature is more complex.
Unlike other military-backed regimes in the region, the identities of those who make up Le Pouvoir and control the country’s politics and economy are not always known to the Algerian public. The military remains the dominant force in politics, and Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha is considered one of the most powerful men in the country. Known for his authoritarian and often brutal style of leadership, Chengriha is a figure Tebboune knows not to cross in order to survive. But Chengriha is only one of several heavyweights. Le Pouvoir also includes business elites, established politicians, and high-ranking security and intelligence men. The obscure nature of Le Pouvoir has allowed it to remain in power for decades amidst domestic, regional, and international pressures on Algeria.
Le Pouvoir had to hold onto the nation’s institutions by appeasing key players while rebuilding a civilian political façade.
Le Pouvoir implemented a two-step process to maintain the status quo after it forced Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019 following weeks of mass Hirak protests. First, Le Pouvoir had to hold onto the nation’s institutions by appeasing key players while rebuilding a civilian political façade. This was implemented through increasing funding to the military and security apparatus and allowing private sector elites to maintain their business monopolies. Tebboune proved to be the perfect candidate for this stage. Already known for being close to the army and Le Pouvoir, he would be a civilian face with no military background, which could boost regime legitimacy. Le Pouvoir was keen not to present itself as a complete authoritarian regime run by a military-leader-turned-president, as Tebboune’s predecessors were almost all from the military institution, and instead sought to present itself as a regime going through a process of democratization after Hirak. As a result, Tebboune publicly praised Hirak and promised change early on in his presidency.
The second, less carefully crafted step was to fully neutralize the Hirak movement and its demands for systemic change. Soon after Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019, Algerian police arrested more than 50 people thought to be the informal leaders of Hirak, and electoral authorities decided to swiftly hold a presidential election in the same year as a way of absorbing public calls for change. Following Tebboune’s election in December 2019, the regime’s crackdown on Hirak intensified. Hirak leaders were arrested on “terrorism” charges that were later broadened in order to keep more activists and journalists in prison. Rights groups have raised serious concerns about the repression.
Yet Le Pouvoir’s weakening of Hirak proved to be shortsighted and counterproductive. Many Algerians came to see Tebboune as a new, more aggressive Bouteflika, making him deeply unpopular. The decision to excessively crack down on Hirak followed the same line of thinking that led Le Pouvoir to make questionable decisions, such as advancing the presidential election, which have weakened the regime’s popular legitimacy. Indeed, following last month’s vote, Tebboune will face a number of challenges that could cause disruption if not addressed.
Foreign Challenges and Implications for US policy
On the international front, some promising developments have occurred under Tebboune. The country was one of the largest beneficiaries of the economic fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Western governments looked to Algeria as an energy alternative after the West sanctioned and restricted Russia’s oil and gas exports; Europe, in particular, was searching for new energy supplies. As a result, Algeria’s share in the European natural gas market increased from 12 percent in 2020 to 19 percent in 2023. Algeria also was elected to the UN Security Council and hosted Fatah and Hamas representatives in an effort to unify Palestinian factions.
Western governments looked to Algeria as an energy alternative after the West sanctioned and restricted Russia’s oil and gas exports.
But there have also been foreign policy setbacks since Tebboune came to power, complicating Algeria’s quest to expand its influence in the Arab and Islamic worlds and on the African continent. Algeria’s application to join the BRICS group of nations was rejected by India and Brazil in August 2023, despite the admission of other regional power players such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The rejection was a foreign policy embarrassment, as Tebboune had been openly courting Russian President Vladimir Putin for months to earn a spot in the organization.
Algeria has also struggled to maintain a balance of cordial and productive relations with both eastern powers such as Russia and western powers such as France, Spain, and the United States. American-Algerian relations, never close, have experienced challenges in recent years. Most notably, after decades of support for the Sahrawi people’s demands for Western Saharan independence from Morocco and years of counter-lobbying, Algeria was furious with the Trump administration’s 2020 decision to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the region.
Yet, Tebboune’s actions and questions about electoral foul play are unlikely to change the prevailing Washington view of Algeria’s strategic importance. The Biden administration, while continuing Trump’s Western Sahara policy, has sought to strengthen ties with Algiers, in particular to counter Russia influence in North Africa. Given US priorities of counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel and providing alternative energy to Europe, the Biden administration apparently decided to turn a blind eye to electoral irregularities by congratulating Algeria on the September vote while making no mention of the controversies. In light of the geopolitics at work, whatever American administration is sworn in on January 20, 2025, will likely be keen on building what the Biden administration describes as a “strong bilaterial relationship.”
Turbulent Local Waters and Self-Inflicted Wounds
With political heavyweights appeased, public spaces closed, Hirak neutralized, and Tebboune reelected, it might seem that Le Pouvoir has succeeded in its plan to ride out the Hirak wave and maintain the status quo. Yet several domestic and regional issues could pose problems for Tebboune and the Algerian regime behind him.
On the domestic front, Algerians appeared largely unconvinced by the official electoral results. As in 2019, Tebboune’s largest hurdle remains that he lacks a popular base of support, with the Algerian street in a state of political malaise and desperation since the sidelining of Hirak. Despite oil gains, the Algerian economy still remains overly bureaucratic, stifling entrepreneurship which prevents much needed job growth. Algeria’s youth, who make up nearly two-thirds of the population, are hit the hardest by the stagnant economy and its overreliance on oil. Youth unemployment stands at 32 percent amidst increased inflation.
The regime’s electoral conduct created self-inflicted wounds that Tebboune and Le Pouvoir could regret in the future. In the past, Algerian political elites have been very careful in crafting and choreographing decisions that may cause public uproar. Historically, when Le Pouvoir took rash decisions, Algerians paid dearly. The most notable example was the military’s decision to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 and take power in a coup after the opposition Islamic Salvation Front party was on the verge of winning a majority. This choice led to the so-called Black Decade, which plunged the country into a dark and deadly civil war between Islamic insurgency groups and the military that caused the death of more than 150,000 Algerians. Today, despite the demise of Hirak, frustration remains pervasive. These grievances should concern Tebboune and Le Pouvoir, especially considering the widespread national anger over Israel’s massacre of Palestinians in Gaza.
Tebboune and Le Pouvoir may be able to survive without making major concessions. The current climate, along with the regime’s repressive arsenal, would seem to make it unlikely that another peaceful democratic movement like Hirak could pour into the streets once again. Yet the lack of peaceful and democratic discourse could create an environment ripe for militant movements that have a history of effectively channeling public anger into armed conflict against the state.
Thus, it is in the best interest of Tebboune and Le Pouvoir to make small but steady political and economic reforms and concessions to prevent the opportunity for a dangerous upheaval. Expanding the space available for traditional opposition parties that plan to campaign for the 2026 parliamentary elections and freeing prominent political prisoners, such as independent journalist Ihsan El Kadi and activists Said Boudour and Kaddour Chouicha, would provide the public a safety valve to express their frustration and dampen brewing anger against the state. Similarly, Tebboune’s recent decision to expand social spending is a good step if expanded with rising inflation. Most important, Le Pouvoir must reconsider its desire to guarantee maximum social control, as the dominance of the security apparatus may well, over time, create too many grievances among the citizenry.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Facebook/Algerian Presidency
