The Trump administration and the right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been following a roadmap toward their own version of a New Middle East—a phrase made notorious by President George W. Bush’s secretary of state Condoleezza Rice when she described Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon as “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” In those days, the Bush administration still believed that its vision of remaking the region, launched with its 2003 invasion of Iraq, would triumph. Two decades after that failure, the new, similarly fantastical Trump-Netanyahu roadmap uses the multilayered Israeli wars started after October 7, 2023, as weigh-stations to reach the destination—a region in which Israel is the hegemon, acting at will to neutralize Iran and its “Axis of Resistance,” with the United States as Israel’s indulgent ally.
The US-backed Israeli wars have devastated Gaza in order to weaken Hamas. They have sidelined Hezbollah and caused serious damage to Lebanon and have destroyed seaport and airport facilities in Yemen to strike back at the Houthis. Most recently, Israel, joined by the United States, reached Iran with 12 days of attacks against its nuclear sites, followed by Iranian counterattacks on Israel and a US air base in Qatar. But judging from the results to date, it does not appear that the United States and Israel are close to achieving their goal of a new Middle East.
Rice admitted in 2004 that the information on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, on which the Bush administration had built its case for invading Iraq, was faulty, blaming it on poor intelligence. But she justified the war as having rid the world of a dangerous man. In 2006, she praised Israel for degrading Hezbollah’s power, an act that she considered an essential part of strengthening the forces of “peace and democracy” in the region, which would supposedly help usher a “New Middle East.” Then-secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld—the recognized architect of the Iraq invasion—and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, in the same vein talked about the domino effect in reverse, claiming that democratic change in Iraq would lead to the toppling of other autocratic regimes and spread democracy across the region.
It does not appear that the US and Israel are close to achieving their goal of a new Middle East.
Donald Trump’s Abraham Accords of 2020 are based on a similarly far-fetched idea that normalization between Israel and the Arab world—sans the Palestinians—will bring peace, security, and prosperity to the Middle East. Importantly, the accords are based on a willful sidelining of the question of Palestine and of the rights of the Palestinians. In the Trump era, the vision is for an Arab world that would normalize relations with Israel and open its markets to American investments—in essence, capitalism without democracy—without a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The war on Gaza and the related attacks on what has been dubbed as “Iran’s arms” in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen are all part of this latest goal of a New Middle East. Here is an assessment of each of the targets in the US-Israel roadmap in turn, in reverse chronological order.
Iran
Iran’s clerical regime has not fallen in the wake of the Israeli and US strikes, as many observers had hastened to predict would happen. To be sure, the Islamic Republic suffered hundreds of civilian casualties, lost perhaps dozens of military commanders and atomic scientists, and sustained significant damage to its nuclear sites. Far from rushing to evacuate Tehran, as President Trump advised, the Iranian people demonstrated resilience. Thus far, their aversion to foreign invasion has kept them from directing their fear and anger against the clerical regime in Tehran. There are of course inside Iran numerous opponents of the regime, some of whom are minority communities, while others are Shia who are uncomfortable with the mullah’s repressive rule. Historically, Iran’s opposition has been courted by Israel and the United States for potential use against the regime. This round of conflict has not, so far, advanced that cause.
Experts have provided different assessments of the damage to Iran’s nuclear sites, the primary target of US and Israeli attacks. Sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, described as “obliterated” by President Trump, have been characterized as “severely damaged” by US military analysts and by independent experts. It follows that assessments of how quickly Iranian authorities might be able to rebuild their nuclear program also vary and may be impossible to accurately assess, at least for the time being. It remains to be seen if the United States and Iran can get back to negotiating a new nuclear agreement to supersede the defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or will once again resort to threats and a return to violence. For now, and despite reports that the United States and Iran will resume nuclear talks, the Islamic Republic insists on its right to enrich uranium, and denies that such talks are being planned.
Lebanon
The sound of Israeli drones flying overhead can be heard daily in Beirut and often in villages in Mount Lebanon and the eastern Beqaa Valley. Most of these drones are on surveillance missions, but some are weaponized and fire missiles when a listed target has been identified. Like the Palestinians, the Lebanese have taken to identifying the drones as “zinnaneh” and “wizzazeh” based on the sound they emit. To be sure, Israeli flyovers have become a fact of life in Lebanon and a daily reminder of Israel’s dominance of the skies over the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel reported a cost of $2.5 billion from its recent war with Hezbollah, and damage to an estimated 2,900 buildings on the country’s northern border. The World Bank has estimated Lebanon’s cost from the war at $8.5 billion, with 100,000 homes damaged. But it is harder to assess the impact on Hezbollah in terms of depleted weaponry and the war-readiness of its fighters. The November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah left Israeli forces in control of five strategic hills in southern Lebanon while the armed group had to retreat to points north of the Litani River, which Israel has gradually identified and bombed with jets and drone-fired missiles.
Hezbollah is down but not out and has thus far refused to disarm.
In Israeli-US June 2025 attacks on Iran, Hezbollah remained on the sidelines, something that would have been unthinkable even one year ago. By all accounts, Hezbollah is down but not out. Secretary-General Naim Qassem has thus far refused to hand over the party’s weapons to the Lebanese state and promises Israel a tough fight ahead should its forces invade Lebanon to do the disarming themselves. This would present a significant problem to President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and the Lebanese cabinet, who have given hope of positive change in the country, particularly regarding economic reform. Israel and the United States are pressuring the government to disarm Hezbollah. Aoun, a former army commander, understands how dangerous it would be to confront even a weakened Hezbollah. In his inaugural speech on January 9, 2025, Aoun spoke of centralizing all weapons in the hands of the state, but has not yet taken any forceful action in this regard. His alternative is to come to an agreement with Hezbollah and its Lebanese supporters through dialogue—something that is also yet to happen. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the new president and government may choose inaction. But political paralysis will please no one and leave serious economic and political problems unresolved.
Yemen
Of the members of the Axis of Resistance, Yemen’s Houthis have suffered the least damage since launching their war of support for the Palestinians of Gaza in October 2023. Hundreds of American and Israeli strikes, both aerial and naval, over the past 15 months have destroyed oil storage tanks in Hodeida, airport runways, and planes parked on the tarmac, at an estimated cost of $500 m, in addition to homes in Sanaa and Saadah—the latter is the Houthis’ ancestral redoubt—farther north. Israeli sources claim to have degraded Houthi fire power by striking directly at weapons depots and supply lines, including at their points of origin in western Iran. However, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, assert that their reserves are more than adequate to launch new strikes on Israel and to go back to harassing Red Sea shipping if the United States resumes its strikes against them.
The Houthis are known to have hidden caches of weapons and missiles, their own manufacturing capabilities, and alternate sources of smuggled weapons should the supply line from Iran dry up. Additionally, attacks by Israel may have helped them consolidate their internal front and silenced any domestic opposition in the north. The Houthis’ May 2025 temporary non-aggression agreement with the Trump administration helped to bolster the group’s position domestically, since the Houthis’ opponents—members of the Presidential Leadership Council, the secessionist Southern Transition Council, and others—had been counting on US military support in order to launch a new attempt at toppling the group from its power base in Sanaa. The Houthis have not had much of an impact on Israel in the past 15 months, but they have held their own. In the event of another all-out war against Iran in which the latter decides to mine and block the strait of Hormuz, the Houthis could return to endangering traffic through the Red Sea and block traffic through the Bab al-Mandab waterway, the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The closure of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, even briefly, would seriously affect international shipping and drive up energy prices for all consumers.
Gaza
Twenty months after the start of the October 7 war, Gaza lies devastated, its population driven from their homes. The unprecedented death toll among Palestinians continues to rise, reaching more that 57,000 as of this writing. The Netanyahu government seems determined to depopulate Gaza through starvation and death, destruction, and forced displacement. But Hamas still stands as an organization and a fighting force. It continues to find ways to conduct surprise attacks against Israeli soldiers, causing daily casualties, albeit on a relatively minor scale. In brief, Israel has failed to end Hamas’s operations.
Hamas still stands as an organization and a fighting force and continues to find ways to attack Israeli soldiers.
Even before Israel’s 12-day war with Iran, it was obvious that there was no clear victor in the 15-month war against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthis. Indeed, all have had their share of bruising and loss. Israel, at great cost to its economy and population, has failed to achieve the total defeat of any of the members of the axis of resistance. It has been able to free its hostages held by Hamas only through mediation and diplomacy, and it is not likely to free the rest using its military. Current talks to reach a 60-day ceasefire are still inconclusive, but what is assured is that Hamas is unlikely to agree to a deal unless Israel ends its genocidal assault on the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s attack on Iran thus far appears to be a strategic mistake as it has not obliterated the Islamic Republic’s nuclear capabilities—the achievement touted by the American president—and retaliatory strikes by Iran have caused unprecedented damage and interruption to civilian life in Israel. Tehran today may even choose to develop a nuclear weapons program because of the threat it perceives from continued Israeli attacks and American complicity. Meanwhile, the cost to Palestinian life and Gaza’s infrastructure has been devastating. Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis have caused significant damage to Israel, but their war of support has failed to relieve the pressure on Gaza.
Subsequently, there are only two alternative paths at this point: creative diplomacy to save whatever peace options are left in the region, or endless war. But considering all sides’ stubborn adherence to declared positions, chances of a return to violence are far greater than those of achieving sustainable peace. Thus, Trump and Netanyahu’s vision of a New Middle East may only be partially accomplished by the induction of all Gulf Arab states into the Abraham Accords, a task that still appears difficult. The governments of Lebanon and Syria do not appear in a rush to join the accords, making the dream of the New Middle East harder than the Trump-Netanyahu duo can imagine.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Flickr/The White House
