On February 27, 2025, Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), made a historic call, through a letter, for the organization he founded to lay down arms and dissolve itself. In fact, this was not Ocalan’s first call for the PKK, designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, to end its armed struggle. But his previous statements called for ending violence and finding a political solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. This time, his words were directed exclusively at the PKK and went beyond the call for an end to the armed struggle, by calling for the group to dissolve itself. While this appears to be a historic turning point, there is a gap in the way that both the government and Kurdish groups have interpreted the letter and its implications. While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) reads the letter as signaling the Turkish state’s definitive victory over the Kurdish insurgency, the Kurdish political movement tends to read it as an evolution of the Kurdish resistance into a new and entirely non-violent phase.
Similarly, expectations about a potential peace process between the Turkish state and the Kurds differ. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hopes to use it mainly to secure support for constitutional change and to secure his presidency. In contrast, the Kurdish political movement presents the letter and the call for the dissolution of the PKK as an opportunity to end state repression of Kurdish political structures. Furthermore, both sides read the implications of the letter for regional Kurdish politics, especially in Syria, differently. The Turkish government argues that the PKK’s elimination should also mean the demise of its regional offshoots, especially the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria, while many Kurds believe that with the PKK out of the picture, Turkey should abandon its hostile stance toward Kurdish political structures outside Turkey and above all pursue a more conciliatory policy toward Kurdish autonomy in Syria. These different positions and the ability of the two sides to reconcile them will determine whether this latest phase of the Kurdish peace process—arguably the most promising and advanced attempt so far—can succeed where previous efforts have failed.
The Background of the Process
The AKP-led government has previously launched two peace processes between the state and the PKK—the first between 2009 and 2011, and the second between 2013 and 2015. Both ended in failure, leading to an escalation in violence. These past failures have shaped today’s cautious approach by the government and Kurdish actors as well as the broader public.
The first public signal of the process leading to Ocalan’s call came unexpectedly from Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally in Erdoğan’s ruling coalition. On October 22, 2024, Bahceli made a striking statement calling on Ocalan to take the initiative in bringing an end to the PKK. Bahceli’s statement suggested that Ocalan should address the Turkish Parliament to announce the PKK’s self-dissolution in exchange for benefiting from his legal right to a review of his prison sentence. This was a surprising shift by the MHP, which had fiercely opposed all previous peace efforts. In fact, however, by the time Bahceli made his statement, the process had already been underway for months through behind-the-scenes negotiations between Ocalan and the state. It is likely that Bahceli’s announcement only came after the talks reached a certain stage. Throughout the process, Bahceli has functioned as the government’s main spokesperson and political guarantor, helping to preempt a nationalist backlash.
At the same time, the government took preemptive measures to neutralize opposition from hardline nationalists. One of the most prominent examples was the arrest of Umit Ozdag, a popular far-right politician, before the peace process could gain momentum. On January 20, 2025, the authorities arrested Ozdag for insulting the president and on January 21 charged him with inciting public hatred through discriminatory rhetoric against Syrian refugees. While these charges were ostensibly unrelated to the peace process, his detention effectively prevented nationalist factions from mobilizing significant opposition to any PKK reconciliation. This points to a distinguishing feature of the current process: unlike previous AKP-led peace processes, this one has not been framed as part of a broader democratization effort. On the contrary, it is unfolding during Turkey’s arguably most authoritarian period in recent history.
Ocalan’s Call and the PKK’s Response
Following Bahceli’s statement, a delegation composed of prominent Kurdish politicians was formed to facilitate communication between Ocalan and the state. This delegation visited him multiple times in prison, discussing the terms and implications of his call to end violence. The delegation also held discussions with government officials and other political actors to negotiate the broader framework of the peace process. The content of Ocalan’s February 27 letter reflected the consensus reached during these meetings, suggesting that it was not Ocalan’s personal initiative but rather the outcome of a broader negotiated settlement. The letter marked a significant departure from Ocalan’s previous positions. Notably, he explicitly rejected his earlier demands for independence, federalism, decentralization, and even cultural rights for the Kurdish people, instead putting forward only a vague call for a ‘democratic republic’ without specifying concrete political guarantees for Kurdish rights.
The PKK’s positive response to Ocalan’s directives suggests that key aspects of the process were already agreed to behind closed doors.
While questions have long persisted about whether the PKK would fully comply with Ocalan’s directives, its immediate positive response suggests that key aspects of the process were already agreed to behind closed doors. The organization is now expected to convene a congress in the coming months to formalize its dissolution. However, significant uncertainty remains regarding the future of the PKK’s armed elements, as neither the Turkish state nor Kurdish representatives have yet outlined a clear roadmap for disarmament, relocation, or reintegration. Moreover, although the PKK immediately declared a ceasefire, Turkey continues its military operations targeting PKK forces in Syria and Iraq.
Why Are the Sides Engaging in This Process?
Erdoğan’s Political Calculations
Erdoğan abandoned the previous Kurdish peace process in 2015 after the AKP lost its parliamentary majority and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) refused to support his push for an even more powerful “executive” presidency. Overnight, Erdoğan pivoted to a staunchly nationalist and anti-Kurdish stance, eventually forging an alliance with Turkey’s far-right. This nationalist coalition, strengthened by state resources and by a shift toward authoritarian governance, helped Erdoğan win several elections since. However, with Turkey’s economic decline, the coalition’s ability to sustain his grip on power has weakened.
Erdoğan survived the 2023 elections thanks to a massive spending spree and strategic mistakes by the opposition—notably, choosing a less-than-charismatic candidate—but his popularity continued to drop. In the 2024 local elections, the AKP fell to second place for the first time, exposing the fragility of the ruling coalition. Faced with this reality, Erdoğan must now broaden his political base.
Erdoğan is no longer forced to choose between Kurdish and Turkish ultra-nationalist support.
Erdoğan is constitutionally barred from running for another term (he has been president since 2014). He needs a constitutional amendment, which requires either a two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass directly or at least three-fifths support in the legislature to trigger a public referendum. However, he lacks the necessary parliamentary numbers for either option. Even if he were to secure enough votes for a referendum through political maneuvering, he does not currently have the broad popular backing needed to win such a vote. Having previously ended the peace process to consolidate his power, Erdoğan is now reviving it to extend his rule. Unlike in 2015, however, the MHP is now fully integrated into his ruling bloc, meaning that Erdoğan is no longer forced to choose between Kurdish and Turkish ultra-nationalist support. He has effectively absorbed nationalist elements into the system, ensuring their compliance through a combination of repression and political incentives. This time, he enters the process from a more advantageous position.
The Kurdish Perspective
On the Kurdish side, the persistence of armed conflict has increasingly become a burden for the movement. The PKK has not conducted significant military operations inside Turkey for years, with clashes largely confined to Iraq and Syria. Facing mounting pressure, the organization has increasingly been forced into a defensive position, as Turkey’s successful use of drones has further restricted PKK activity, rendering it largely immobilized even outside Turkey’s borders. While the PKK has occasionally demonstrated its ability to carry out selective attacks within Turkey, these incidents no longer serve a clear political purpose, nor do they advance Kurdish political or social demands.
Meanwhile, state repression of Kurdish political activism has escalated. The widespread government practice of appointing government trustees to replace elected Kurdish mayors has become routine. Most political crackdowns are justified under vague and broad accusations of “supporting terrorism,” which means that as long as the PKK exists, the state can continue using this justification to suppress peaceful Kurdish political activities. If the PKK is removed from the equation, it would become significantly harder for the government to label legal Kurdish political actors as “terror affiliates” and justify their removal from office. Beyond its impact on the Kurdish movement, the dissolution of the PKK has broader implications for the state of democracy in Turkey.
The Democracy Question
The Kurdish issue has long been one of the biggest obstacles to democratization in Turkey. Successive governments have used counterterrorism as a pretext for authoritarian measures, making the conflict a major driver of democratic backsliding. In this sense, the removal of the PKK from the equation is not just significant for the Kurdish issue but also represents a potential turning point for Turkish democracy.
But this does not necessarily mean that democratization will follow. Erdoğan’s primary goal is not to restore the rule of law or expand democratic rights but to reinforce his grip on power by strategically expanding his “minimum winning coalition.” Instead of embracing democratic reforms, he has used the process as a political bargaining tool. This is evident in the fact that he has not even hinted at any democratic concessions throughout the negotiations. Moreover, the practice of appointing government trustees to remove opposition-led municipalities has now extended beyond Kurdish mayors to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
It is likely that, as part of this process, Erdoğan will refrain from appointing trustees to replace mayors of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party (an offshoot of the HDP), in exchange for political support from the Kurdish movement. However, this should not be mistaken for democratization—it is merely a political arrangement designed to serve Erdoğan’s interests. If he does not receive the electoral or political backing that he expects from Kurdish actors, he could abandon the process just as he did in 2015.
Regional and International Implications
The Kurdish issue has increasingly taken on a transnational character in recent decades, with developments in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria deeply interconnected. Given this reality, any peace process in Turkey is bound to have significant regional ramifications, influencing Kurdish political dynamics across the Middle East and shaping Ankara’s relations with neighboring states.
One of the key areas of impact is northern Iraq, where the PKK’s primary military infrastructure is based. Over the years, Turkey has conducted extensive military operations along its border with Iraq, steadily expanding the scope of these interventions deeper into Iraqi territory. This has strained Turkey’s ties with both the Iraqi central government and Kurdish actors in the region. In recent years, Turkey has sought to bring Baghdad into closer cooperation in the fight against the PKK, encouraging the Iraqi government to take action against the group. Yet progress has been limited. Last year, under Turkish pressure, Baghdad symbolically added the PKK to its list of banned organizations. Yet, in reality, no such official list with concrete enforcement mechanisms exists. Turkey’s main demand for Baghdad is the formal designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization, but this has not been fully accepted—partly because such a designation would legally require Iraq to engage in counterterrorism operations against the group, which it lacks the capability to conduct effectively. If a peace process moves forward significantly, high-ranking PKK members may seek asylum in Iraq, and groundwork for such a scenario will need to be established through diplomatic negotiations.
Among Iraqi Kurds, Turkey has long maintained close relations with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani family, while Iran has supported the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), historically dominated by the Talabani family. Despite strong political and economic relations, Turkish military operations have been a source of tension in Turkey’s ties with the KDP. While these operations have not fundamentally disrupted the partnership, they remain a recurring point of discomfort in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Turkey’s relationship with the PUK remains extremely strained, as Ankara views it as a collaborator with the PKK. This has led Turkey to impose restrictions, such as closing airspace to flights bound for Sulaymaniyah, which is a PUK stronghold. Given that the Qandil Mountains—where the PKK’s command structure is based—fall within PUK-controlled areas, the potential dissolution of the PKK would primarily benefit the PUK, possibly paving the way for improved relations with Turkey. In fact, both the KDP and the PUK have publicly expressed support for Ocalan’s call.
If Ankara sees the PKK’s dissolution as an opportunity to engage in conciliatory policies toward Kurdish governance in Syria, the peace process may gain momentum.
However, even more than Iraq, Syria remains the central issue—especially now that the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been replaced by the Turkey-friendly Hay`at Tahrir al-Sham. While Erdoğan’s political calculations played a decisive role in ending the 2015 peace process, disagreements over Kurdish governance in Syria also became a key point of contention between Ankara and the PKK, reinforcing the collapse of negotiations. It is notable that Abdullah Ocalan’s latest statement made no mention of Syria. Although both Kurdish representatives and Turkish officials deny any explicit negotiations on this matter, many speculate that some form of tacit understanding could be in place—whereby the PKK might abandon its demands in Turkey in exchange for a more accommodating Turkish policy toward Kurdish self-governance in Syria. Turkish officials continue to insist that they expect SDF to disband as well. The March 10 SDF announcement that it will integrate into Syrian state institutions could be good news in this regard. Meanwhile, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi made it clear that Ocalan’s call for disbandment was directed at the PKK, not at his organization, and that the PKK’s decisions do not concern the SDF. This is in line with the SDF’s long-standing position that it is a separate entity from the PKK. The United States has also maintained a similar position, emphasizing that the SDF should be treated as a distinct entity and not as an arm of the PKK. Washington expects that the dissolution of the PKK will ease Turkey’s concerns over American ties with the SDF, potentially reducing tensions between Ankara and Washington over US support for Syrian Kurdish forces.
Turkey’s next moves in Syria will be crucial. If Ankara sees the PKK’s dissolution as an opportunity to engage in more conciliatory policies toward Kurdish governance in the new Syria, the peace process may gain momentum. However, if Turkey continues to insist on dismantling Syrian Kurdish structures through military force, this could undermine the entire peace process.
Overall, Ocalan’s call for the dissolution of the PKK could mark a pivotal moment in Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish conflict. But success hinges on whether the process fosters genuine political reconciliation or simply acts as a short-term political maneuver within Erdoğan’s broader strategy for staying in power. The implications extend beyond Turkey, affecting regional Kurdish dynamics and shaping Ankara’s relations with Iraq and post-Assad Syria. If managed constructively, this shift could pave the way for a new political landscape for Kurds in Turkey. But if treated as a short-term political strategy, the conflict may eventually reignite, trapping both Turkey and the Kurdish movement in a familiar cycle of violence.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: Shutterstock/Tinxi
