US presidential elections are usually decided on domestic issues, especially the economy. A candidate’s resting his or her presidential laurels on a foreign policy “triumph” has often proved ephemeral, as when George H.W. Bush successfully ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 only to lose to Bill Clinton in 1992 as Americans grappled with a recession. Although there have been times in US history when foreign policy does influence an election, they have been scarce. Nonetheless, in very close races such as this year’s match-up between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris, foreign policy issues could tip the balance. In particular, voters’ views of how the candidates would handle the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah and the Russia-Ukraine wars could be decisive in battleground states and thus the election.
Recent History as Barometer
The 1980 election stands out as an example of how foreign policy can affect an election result—in that instance, negatively for an incumbent. The last 15 months of President Jimmy Carter’s term were dominated by the Iran hostage crisis and by his failure, until his last day in office, to secure the release of American diplomats detained in Iran. The ill-fated hostage rescue mission in April 1980 only added to what voters perceived as Carter’s impotence to free them. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which brought Soviet forces closer to the Strait of Hormuz through which much of the world’s oil passed, was another negative foreign policy factor for Carter. The Republican nominee, Ronald Reagan, capitalized on Carter’s perceived weakness by advocating for a more robust national security policy. To be sure, domestic issues—such as high inflation and unemployment—were also factors in the 1980 race, but voters’ sense of an American superpower in decline played to Reagan’s strengths and contributed to his victory.
Foreign policy contributed to George W. Bush’s re-election as he was able to portray himself as a strong leader.
Foreign policy also contributed to President George W. Bush’s 2004 re-election. He was able to portray himself as a strong and decisive leader in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States and the subsequent “war on terror.” Although his decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 was highly controversial among the American public later, in 2004 he was able to show voters that he acted decisively in bringing down the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, whom he portrayed as a threat to the United States and its allies. By contrast, the Democratic Party nominee that year, John Kerry, appeared ambiguous on the Iraq war—he voted for the war resolution in November 2002 but then expressed misgivings. The fact that US forces captured Saddam Hussein in late 2003 and in 2001-2002 had routed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan worked to Bush’s advantage and helped him win re-election.
Biden’s Return to a More Traditional Foreign Policy
After the erratic years of the Trump presidency, President Joe Biden restored the US standing in NATO after Trump had questioned the alliance’s utility as well as criticized some alliance members’ shortcomings in funding defense spending. Biden also strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and provided the latter with some $175 billion in economic and military assistance. While his fellow Democrats, and a majority of the American public, supported these Biden policies, the Ukraine war became contentious within Republican Party circles. Traditional Republican figures such as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) have favored robust assistance to Ukraine. But those more connected to Trump’s diehard Make America Great Again (MAGA) base, such as Trump’s running mate JD Vance, have called for an end to such assistance, arguing, inter alia, that it is wasteful.
On Israel/Palestine, Biden’s close embrace of Israel in the wake of the Hamas attack last October put him in line with older Democrats but the more progressive wing of the party and many younger voters came to believe he was not doing enough to stop Israel’s Gaza bombardment that caused tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths. Although Biden subsequently was mildly critical of Israel’s Gaza actions and since May has tried to achieve a lasting ceasefire, he was reluctant to impose any real penalties on Israel or significantly hold up any arms transfers. By contrast, Republicans have been in lockstep with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies and have condemned Biden and the Democrats for any criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza.
Enter Harris
After Biden dropped out of the race and Vice President Kamala Harris secured the Democratic nomination in August, she has essentially followed the Biden approach on foreign policy. She only adjusted her tone on the Israel/Palestine issue, likely aware that Biden’s unswerving support for Israel was costing her some Democratic voters, including Arab-Americans who make up about 5 percent of the electorate in the battleground state of Michigan. That Arab-American voters successfully staged an “uncommitted” campaign during the Democratic primary in February to protest Biden’s Israel policy was not lost on Harris, likely contributing to her campaign’s use of more empathetic language on Palestinian suffering in Gaza.
Harris’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war has not deviated from Biden’s, and she has sought to draw a sharp contrast with the views of Trump and his MAGA base, who seem indifferent on a Ukrainian victory. She has also extolled the Biden administration’s strengthening of the NATO alliance that has helped to support Ukraine against Russia. By contrast, Trump has claimed, without proof, that had he been president in 2022 Putin would not have invaded Ukraine.
Both Candidates Practicing Identity Politics
Both Harris and Trump are articulating foreign policy stances to elicit support from important ethnic constituencies. In addition to courting Arab-Americans, Harris has tried to court Ukrainian-Americans and Polish-Americans in key states. During the September 10 presidential debate, Harris mentioned that if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, he would turn his aggression to Poland and that should be of grave concern to the estimated 700,000 Polish-Americans in Pennsylvania. For his part, Trump refused to answer a question on whether he wants Ukraine to win the war.
On Israel/Palestine, Trump is taking a two-pronged approach. He is using Massad Boulos, a Lebanese-American businessman who is the father of Tiffany Trump’s husband Michael Boulos, and others to conduct outreach to Arab-Americans in Michigan, Arizona, and other key states. At the same time, Trump is trying to court Jewish-American voters by labeling Harris as “anti-Israel” and as someone who “hates Israel.” Trump even made the ludicrous claim that if Harris were to win the presidency, Israel would not exist in two years.
But Are the Candidates’ Strategies Working?
Both candidates have liabilities in reaching out to such constituent groups. Despite Harris’s more sympathetic comments about Palestinian suffering and a two-state solution, she does not appear to be making much headway with Arab-Americans. In recent interviews with young Arab-American voters in Michigan and Minnesota, one voter expressed great disappointment about Harris’s abrupt response to interruptions by pro-Palestinian protesters during her August 7 rally with her statement that “if you want Donald Trump to win, say that.” Another young Arab-American told a journalist that
I think [Harris] shot herself in the foot when she silenced the pro-Palestinian protestors. The Democratic Party keeps pushing this ‘but Trump is worse’ narrative on us, but to those people, to my community, what’s worse than losing 80, 100 family members all at once?
Indeed, on September 19, the Uncommitted National Movement issued a statement saying it could not endorse Harris because of her “unwillingness to shift on an unconditional weapons policy or to even make a clear campaign statement in support of upholding existing US and international human rights law.” Arab-American voters have told reporters that they “can’t stomach” voting for Harris.
But Trump does not appear to be gaining much ground with these voters, either. Many remember with anger Trump’s attempts to ban immigrants from several Muslim majority countries when he came to office in early 2017. They also remember Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian so-called “peace plan” that was skewed heavily in favor of Israel as well as his close association with Netanyahu’s policies.
Trump is trying to court Jewish-American voters by labeling Harris as “anti-Israel.”
The success of Trump’s courting of Jewish-American voters is also uncertain. Perhaps because his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is Jewish, his daughter Ivanka converted to Judaism before she married Kushner, and he strongly supported Israel when he was president, he may think he can say whatever comes to mind when it comes to American Jews. On September 19, Trump charged that if he were to lose the November election, “the Jewish people would have a lot to do with a loss…It’s only because of the Democrat hold, or curse, on you.” He has also said that any Jewish-American who votes for Harris “should have their head examined,” implying that she would be bad for Israel, as if this constituency only votes on a single issue. Trump is clearly upset that Jewish-Americans favor Harris over him by 65 to 34 percent according to a Pew Research poll from late August and early September.
Although younger voters are more supportive of the Palestinians than of Israel and more critical of Israel’s war in Gaza, this issue set may not be their electoral priority. Polling from reputable organizations suggests that they are more concerned with domestic issues such as the economy, crime, education, housing, and health care.
Looking Ahead
Harris has made some gains in the polls since the Democratic convention and the September 10 debate, but as of this writing the November election is statistically a dead heat (most polls are within the margin of error). Domestic issues are likely to be foremost on most voters’ minds when they cast their ballots. Yet because US presidential elections are determined by the electoral college, not by the popular vote, and because some of the battleground states contain constituencies that are concerned about particular global issues, foreign policy could tip the balance.
Harris was likely counting on a Gaza ceasefire agreement being reached before the election to deflate the anger of Arab-Americans, but this looks increasingly unlikely. Moreover, if the Israel-Hezbollah conflict erupts into a full-scale war, such a development could hurt Harris because the administration in which she serves looks weak in preventing a wider Middle East conflagration. Trump’s position (or non-position) on the Ukraine war may alienate many Ukrainian-Americans and Polish-Americans, but he could offset such lost votes by ginning up even more his MAGA base, which wants no US involvement in that conflict. The key issue, therefore, is whether Arab-Americans in swing states will ultimately come back to the Democratic Party, stay home, or vote for another candidate (Trump or a third-party candidate). Due to widespread dissatisfaction with the Biden administration on Gaza and to voters’ expectations that Harris will not support punitive measures on Israel, this foreign policy issue may indeed hurt her chances of becoming president next January.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.
Featured image credit: WAFA
